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THE MYTH OF CIVIC REPUBLICANISM:
INTERROGATING THE IDEOLOGY OF
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL ETHICS
Norman W. Spaulding
INTRODUCTION
Another common trait of myths is the manifest impossibility of
many of the events and beings described. Fifty-headed monsters,
shape-changing deities, talking animals, descents to the underworld,
and chariot-drawn flights through the sky all testify to myth's
characteristic concern with experiences beyond the normal or
natural .... 2
Now the difference between legend and history is in most cases
easily perceived by a reasonably experienced reader .... Their
structure is different .... [Legend] runs far too smoothly. All cross-
currents, all friction, all that is casual, secondary to the main events
and themes, everything unresolved, truncated, and uncertain, which
confuses the clear progress of the action and the simple orientation
of the actors, has disappeared .... [I]t knows only clearly outlined
men who act from few and simple motives and the continuity of
whose feelings and actions remains uninterrupted.... To write
history is so difficult that most historians are forced to make
concessions to the technique of legend.
The argument of this article is that the morally activist concept of
lawyering so often said to prevail among nineteenth-century civic
republican legal elites is more mythical than real. Contemporary
1. Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Boalt Hall School of Law.
J.D., 1997, Stanford Law School; B.A., 1993, Williams College. I owe warm thanks to
participants in the faculty workshops at Boalt Hall and Stanford Law School for
raising insightful comments and questions on this article. I am especially grateful to
William H. Simon for provocative remarks on an earlier draft, to Deborah L. Rhode
for encouraging me to think critically about professional history, and to Bruce Green
for inviting me to contribute to this symposium. The article also benefited from
discussions with Stephen McG. Bundy, Philip Frickey, and Laurent Mayali. I am
deeply indebted to Alice Youmans, Head of Reference at the Boalt Hall Library, for
her tireless assistance in marshalling so many of the historical sources reviewed for
this article, and to David Zaft, Carlie Ware, and Margaret Richarson for invaluable
research assistance.
2. The New Princeton Handbook of Poetic Terms 198 (T.V.F. Brogan ed., 1994).
3. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western
Literature 19-20 (Willard R. Trask trans., Princeton University Press 1953) (1946).
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scholars attracted to this morally robust idea of law practice (scholars
I have elsewhere called "role critics"4) have made "concessions to the
technique of legend"5 in reporting the history and ideology of
antebellum law practice. These concessions have suppressed a rich
and exceedingly complex antebellum debate-"friction," to borrow
again from Auerbach-on the definition and justifiability of the
lawyer's role. Not only has this debate been suppressed, but the
context that gave rise to the debate and the array of motives that
made the debate so lively have been pushed off the horizon of
analysis. Above all, "'inconvenient' facts" have too often been
ignored.6
Why, for instance, should we believe that law practice and ideology
became more zealous, more client-centered and more amoral when
the profession moved away from the courtroom and into the
boardroom? One can argue, as role critics have, that the temptation
of handsome fees implicit in the rise of corporate capitalism after the
Civil War provoked a self-interested sacrifice of independence and
public morals in the profession, but, according to their own account of
contemporary practice, courtroom advocacy is the provenance of zeal
and amoral temptations.7 Moreover, we know from early nineteenth-
century law practice that, although fees were small relative to later
corporate practice, trials were a grand spectacle-in many parts of the
country they were a primary form of public entertainment. And this
was the age of oratory, when young lawyers made and old lawyers
sustained their careers by prevailing in trial using the arts of
eloquence.' Might not fame, or at least the prospect of establishing a
reputation upon which later work and public office could be gained,
have tempted lawyers to zeal then as much as a large retainer did
during the industrial revolution?
And why should we assume that civic republicanism is
fundamentally inconsistent with adversarial advocacy? Virtuous self-
restraint might require a lawyer to sacrifice a good fee by refusing to
4. See Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. Colo. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2003).
5. Auerbach, supra note 3, at 20.
6. Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
129, 147 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., eds., 1970) (1946).
7. See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in The Good Lawyer:
Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 83, 104 (David Luban ed., 1984) [hereinafter
Luban, The Adversary System].
8. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 312-13 (2d ed. 1985)
("Few lawyers could afford to stray.., far from litigation. Courtroom advocacy, both
East and West, was the main road to prestige, the main way to get recognized as a
lawyer or a leader of the bar .... [And] there is no doubt about the oratorical
athletics. The great courtroom masters really poured it on."); see also id. at 309 ("The
flamboyance, tricks, and courtroom antics of 19th-century lawyers were more than a
matter of personality; this behavior created reputation; and a courtroom lawyer who
did not impress the public and gain a reputation would be hard pressed to survive.").
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take or withdrawing from an unjust case, but might it not also require
a lawyer to sacrifice popular esteem (and future business) by
defending an apparently guilty and publicly despised client in order to
ensure a fair trial, or by helping a client prevail under an arguably
unjust law so that the rule of law will be respected in a society riven by
competing conceptions of what justice requires?
When the concessions to legend are pierced and the historical
context brought into relief, a dramatically different account of
antebellum law practice and ideology emerges. Far from a vision of
law practice that galvanized the profession, or even professional elites,
morally activist civic republicanism operated as an ideal-a deeply
contested, often self-serving, and, on the facts of law practice from the
time, somewhat abnormal and unnatural ideal. And this ideal vied for
dominance with a conception of lawyering defined by commitment to
zealous, client-centered service and profound skepticism about the
lawyer's capacity to act as a moral judge of his clients' ends.9
To say that contemporary scholars have mythologized the concept
of civic republican lawyering, however, is not to say that we can do
without professional mythology, without attempts to use reassuring
narratives drawn from professional history to resolve the fundamental
contradiction between law and justice at the heart of the lawyer's role.
While they surely were not fifty-headed monsters, our professional
deities-the legal elites of the post-revolutionary generations who
helped breathe life into the Constitution, the union, and the common
law-were indeed (and remain) shape-changing and hydra-headed,
capable of supporting radically different narratives about the
profession and its self-conception. But it is just this "manifestly
impossible" fact about the history of legal ethics that we must
interrogate and embrace if we are to have histories of the profession
rather than just myths.
Part I of this essay gives the rough outlines of what Robert Gordon
has aptly called the "declension thesis"-the profession's long fall
from civic republican grace to the norm of amoral advocacy-and role
critics' attempt to redeem professional honor by arguing for a return
to morally activist lawyering on civic republican terms."0 Part II
9. I use the masculine pronoun when making historical references because law
practice in the nineteenth century was generally restricted to men. See Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding state prohibition on practice of law by women).
10. See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in The New High Priests: Lawyers in
Post-Civil War America 51, 61-62 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984) [hereinafter Gordon,
New York City Lawyers] (noting that late nineteenth-century legal elites were already
openly lamenting professional "decline"); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of
Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 48-68 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Independence of
Lawyers] (both defining and voicing skepticism about the declension thesis); id. at 51
(contending nevertheless that "the rhetoric of decline has captured something real");
Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American
Enterprise: 1870-1920, in Professions and Professional Ideologies in America 70, 99
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examines the work of David Hoffman and George Sharswood-the
two major nineteenth-century figures relied upon by role critics to
demonstrate the historical prevalence of morally activist civic
republican legal ethics. In this section, I challenge role critics' claim
that Hoffman and Sharswood's views on the role are consistent with
each other and representative of a civic republican consensus on
moral activism.
Part III surveys the major law periodicals of the early nineteenth
century and exposes the lively debate on the lawyer's role contained
therein. I argue that although Hoffman and Sharswood were well
known at the time and studied by postbellum bar code drafters, they
were hardly the only legal elites who weighed in on the definition and
scope of the lawyer's role. They may not even represent the dominant
antebellum view: the periodical literature reveals that the concept of
client-centered, ethically neutral lawyering was not only well-
recognized in public and professional discourse, but defended far less
apologetically than it is today. Part IV examines anecdotal and
biographical information about prominent lawyers and law practice in
order to suggest that client-centered lawyering was a common practice
that fit contemporary articulations of the professional ideal. I
conclude by urging deeper inquiry into nineteenth-century law
practice and ideology and by suggesting what implications may be
drawn from evidence that the question of the definition, justification,
and habitability of the lawyer's role has always been contested.
I. THE DECLENSION THESIS
A. Fall from Virtue
Role critics generally contend that the profession moved from a
"justice-centered conception" of professional responsibility to an
amoral "client-centered conception" in response to the demands of
corporate capitalism at the close of the nineteenth century." The
narrative offered to account for the moral bankruptcy of the
profession today is thus most often presented by role critics in the
genre of fall and redemption. 2 Prior to the rise of corporate
(Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) [hereinafter Gordon, Legal Thought]; see also Deborah
L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession 1 (2000)
("Lawyers belong to a profession permanently in decline. Or so it appears from the
chronic laments by critics within and outside the bar.... [I]f ever there was a true fall
from grace, it must have occurred quite early in the profession's history.").
11. Ethics and the Legal Profession 26 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston
eds., 1986); see also David R. Papke, The Legal Profession and Its Ethical
Responsibilities: A History, in Ethics and the Legal Profession, supra, at 29, 31, 35.
12. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal
Profession 1, 11-23, 165-314 (1993) (defining and describing the decline of the
nineteenth-century lawyer-statesman ideal).
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capitalism, they emphasize, the profession was characterized by a
number of distinctive traits. Organizationally, the bar was weak,
lacking any unified institutional structure. It was also diffuse
(regulated informally at the local level), and dominated literally by the
apprentice system and solo or small partnership general practice,
figuratively by the spectacle of courtroom advocacy and
statesmanship. Ideologically, the profession was defined by civic
republicanism and faith in natural law. Thus not only was law thought
to have moral content accessible to reason and principled elaboration,
the lawyering role was thought to be uniquely dedicated to the service
of law so conceived. A lawyer was therefore personally responsible
for promoting justice, not just his client's interests.13
This special role for the lawyer reflected a transition from classical
republican principles (which assumed all citizens are capable of
virtuous action) to a version of republicanism that assumed the need
for governance by an elite class of citizens willing to carry the burden
of virtuous governance in a nation otherwise committed to self-
interested pursuits. 4 As Russell Pearce has observed:
In the period following the American Revolution, a number of
political thinkers lost confidence in traditional republicanism's
promise that the people as a whole would rise above self-interest to
virtue. These thinkers came to believe that "the people were
perverting their liberty" and their power with self-interested
pursuits.... [They] sought the solution to this dilemma in a modified
form of republicanism. While advocating a government of "limited
powers subject to elaborate checks and balances.., intended to
limit majoritarian excesses," they sought a virtuous political elite.
Building on the elitist strand of republicanism, which had preferred
the political leadership of landed gentry and professionals, they
13. Id. at 14-17; see also James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The
Law Makers (1950); Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 10, at 82-85 (describing the
Federalist-Whig "these nobiliaire" of law and lawyers as "a mediating force in society
between the wealthy and the masses, between the excesses of commercial acquisition
and leveling democratic politics"); Papke, supra note 11, at 29-33.
14. For a discussion of classical republicanism, see G. Edward White, The
Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835, at 49-53 (1988). On classical
republican antipathy to lawyers, see id. at 78 ("Classical republican ideology was
more sanguine about the presence of law in a republic than about the characteristics
of representatives of the legal profession. One of the ideals of classical republicanism
was 'simplicity,' a word that was intended to signify a lack of pretension ... and a
repudiation of decadent or corrupt symbols of privilege. Lawyers... were
reminiscent of the luxurious and sinister world of monarchs and courtiers that
republican government was designed to forestall."). On the place of civic republican
ideology in revolutionary and post-revolutionary American culture, see Bernard
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967); J.G.A. Pocock,
The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic
Republican Tradition 506-52 (1975); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic 1776-1787 (1969).
14012003]
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found in these two groups the capacity for disinterestedness
"necessary to virtue and realization of the common good."'15
Lawyers, in particular, came to center stage as "the 'ex officio
interpreter[s] of our national credo.' [They] controlled the judicial
branch and dominated the legislature and the executive. '' "6 And, in
the formulation of the nineteenth-century author most often cited by
role critics to initiate the civic republican narrative, lawyers were to be
committed, above all else, to virtuous service. "[W]hat is morally
wrong," David Hoffman wrote, "cannot be professionally right."' 7
With the rise of corporate capitalism, each of the structural
elements of law practice came under pressure and began to change:
republicanism gave way to libertarianism and laissez faire thought;'"
natural law theory gave way to positivism and formalism;' 9 the lawyer
as statesman and courtroom advocate gave way to the lawyer as
counselor and corporate board member;2 ' solo firms gave way to "law
factories";"' the apprentice system gave way to law school training by
the Socratic method;2 2 general practice gave way to specialization; 23
and local, informal regulation of lawyers' conduct gave way to bar
associations and national, uniform codes of professional conduct. 24 At
15. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Chi. L.
Sch. Roundtable 381, 385-86 (2001) (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 387 (alteration in original) (quoting Samuel Haber, The Quest for
Authority and Honor in the American Professions 1750-1900, at 68 (1991)).
17. Id. at 389 (quoting Hoffman).
18. See William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice 30-34 (1998).
19. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 30, 39-42.
20. See Hurst, supra note 13; Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism:
A Sociological Analysis 170 (1977); Gordon, New York City Lawyers, supra note 10,
at 59-61; Michael Schudson, Public, Private, and Professional Lives: The
Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 Am. J. Legal Hist. 191,
201 (1977).
21. See Larson, supra note 20, at 170; Wayne K. Hobson, Symbol of the New
Profession: Emergence of the Large Law Firm, 1870-1915, in The New High Priests:
Lawyers in Post-Civil War America, supra note 10, at 1, 5; Schudson, supra note 20, at
192; see also Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 10, at 72 (describing "symbiotic
relationship" between growth of "the modern law school and the corporate law
firm").
22. See Hurst, supra note 13, at 256-72; Larson, supra note 20, at 171.
23. See Hurst, supra note 13; Schudson, supra note 20, at 201.
24. See Kronman, supra note 12; Gordon, Independence of Lawyers, supra note
10; Gordon, New York City Lawyers, supra note 10; Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique,
Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 697, 703-04 (1988)
[hereinafter Shaffer, Adversary Ethic]. Each of the structural transitions is well
documented in standard historical treatments of the rise of the legal profession. See
generally Maxwell Bloomfield, American Laywers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876
(1976); 2 Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America
(1965); Friedman, supra note 8; Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American
Law, 1780-1860 (1977); Hurst, supra note 13; Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from
Antiquity to Modern Times (1953); Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar
(1980). What is distinctive in role criticism (especially when compared with the
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the center of these changes, role critics contend, were the needs of
emerging corporate capitalists to frame their economic interests and
transactions in the legitimating language of the law, and,
concomitantly, the needs of elite lawyers performing this task to
organize and frame their efforts in a legitimating professional
ideology. As Thomas Shaffer puts it:
[T]hose who were exploiting North America found they needed
legal help, both because they got into trouble and because the legal
forms for transactions, for raising money, and for insulating
commercial behavior from the influence of government, were not
adequate to what the business barons wanted to do. And this, of
course, produced a professional moral agenda: On what terms would
lawyers be enlisted in the business enterprise?
... [C]omplicity with the robber barons became an issue for the
organized legal profession in such a way as to account not only for
the moral issue and the answer to the moral issue, but also for the
existence of the organizations that considered the issue and
formulated principles to deal with it. Until this issue about
complicity [with corporate capitalism] became prominent, there was
not an organized legal profession in anything like the sense in which
lawyers talk about the organized bar today. Bar associations were
formed around the issue of what bar associations should say about
the lawyers who both formed the bar associations and served the
robber barons.
25
Shaffer adds that before "the issue of complicity with rapacious
business surfaced," the legal profession was "almost unorganized,"
and "the general position among vocal American lawyers.., was
Whiggish accounts of Warren, Pound and Chroust) is the view that these transitions
are indicative of professional decline.
25. Thomas Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 St. Mary's L.J. 195,
222-23 (1986) [hereinafter Shaffer, Moral Teacher] (second emphasis added); see also
Larson, supra note 20, at 169-70 ("Partisan legal expertise was, and still is, chiefly
needed by the propertied classes and chiefly available to them .... [E]lite lawyers
used their skills to articulate the legal framework needed by the new business system.
To the corporate economy, lawyers contributed specific tools (such as the equipment
trust certificate and the trust receipt), institutional models (such as the corporation),
and patterns of action for adapting financial and price structures to a national
market.... [H]is mastery of largely uncharted fields and his clients' respect for his
opinions gradually led the business lawyer into extralegal decision-making and
economic planning."); Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 10, at 77 (citing and
discussing Andrew L. Barlow, Coordination and Control: The Rise of Harvard
University: 1825-1910, at 215, 244 (1979)). But see id. at 81, 93, 110 (discounting
instrumental theories of lawyers' complicity with corporate capital, and arguing
instead that the primary good lawyers produced for the interests of corporate capital
was an ideology that helped insulate it from the nascent regulatory state); Gordon,
New York City Lawyers, supra note 10, at 53 ("[Tjhe lawyer's job is selling
legitimacy.").
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'republican'-that is, a lawyer felt himself responsible for what his
clients did with his advice and assistance."2 But as lawyers came to
the aid of capital, they "proclaimed the adversary ethic"-
emphasizing the principles of ethical neutrality and client-centered
service.27 Thus "'[t]he Bar' in America did not have a clear corporate
existence until it defined itself as not responsible for what clients
do."2 For Shaffer and other role critics, this move to the adversary
ethic rendered the modern organized legal profession, "from the first,
a compromised moral teacher."29 The moment of professionalization
(efforts at uniform role definition and regulation) was also the
moment of fall.
Sociological role criticism bolsters this historical claim by arguing
that just as corporate capitalism provided the material foundation for
the emergence of the modern legal profession on terms that
emphasized insulation from moral scrutiny, the underlying, if not
conscious, logic of professionalization was to protect lawyers'
monopoly on access to legal services-to insulate the profession from
both the market and the state. Moving away from the claim that
professions are altruistically motivated and perform an important
social function by mediating between the interests of capital and the
public," post-functionalist sociologists emphasize the rather telling
26. Shaffer, Moral Teacher, supra note 25, at 223.
27. Id.
28. Id.; cf. Gordon, New York City Lawyers, supra note 10, at 65-66 (noting that
the decline of the civic republican ideal actually provoked at least two alternatives to
the client-centered vision of the lawyer as "apolitical technician": the
"institutionalized schizophrenia" of client-centered private practice combined with
public service, and a "reactionary" vision combining faith in corporate concentration,
property rights, and individualism).
29. Shaffer, Moral Teacher, supra note 25, at 223; see also Gordon, Independence
of Lawyers, supra note 10, at 48 ("declension thesis"); L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics
and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 Emory L.J. 909, 948 (1980); Schudson, supra
note 20, at 208; Shaffer, Adversary Ethic, supra note 24, at 701, 703-09; Simon, supra
note 19, at 36-37; Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests,
36 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1303, 1314 (1995); cf Pearce, supra note 15, at 385-86
(presenting view of Founders that lawyers as professionals pursue the public good
rather than their own self-interest).
30. The original functionalist statement is Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics
and Civic Morals 5-13 (Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1958); see also Philip Elliott, The
Sociology of the Professions 6-9 (1972) ("Emile Durkheim ... suggested that the
division of labour in society was itself functional for the maintenance of social
cohesion.... His hope was that the occupational group would develop a form like the
family, but on a larger scale. It was to occupy a mid-point, between the State and the
family, in the social structure.... Durkheim thought that occupational corporations
would create a moral and communal order to counter the anomie of industrial society.
Others saw in professionalism, and the ideal of altruistic service, a method of
achieving similar ends .... Particular stress in the inter-war period was laid on the
contrast between business and the professions. This was a contrast between economic
self-interest and altruistic service for limited rewards, between the profit motive and
professional ethics.").
For criticism of functionalism see Eliot Freidson, The Theory of Professions:
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nexus between the defining traits of the professions (socially
recognized expertise and freedom to self-regulate) and their material
interests (controlling the supply of and competition for professional
services). Secure profit and prestige are the basic professional goals
on this account, asserted expertise and self-regulation the means:
To insure their livelihood, the rising professionals had to unify the
corresponding areas of the social division of labor around
homogeneous guarantees of competence. The unifying principles
could be homogeneous only to the extent that they were
universalistic-that is, autonomously defined by the professionals
and independent, at least in appearance, from the traditional and
external guarantees of status stratification. Thus, the modern
reorganization of professional work and professional markets
tended to found credibility on a different, and much enlarged,
monopolistic base-the claim to sole control of superior expertise. 31
The profession was thus compromised not only by service to
corporate capital and adoption of the adversary ethic, but also by its
rent-seeking efforts to ensure that only members of the profession
prescribed standards of entry, practice and discipline. 2 Insulated
from and yet profoundly impacting public morality, the market, and
the state, the profession was free to pursue personal gain through the
maximization of clients' interests.33
State of the Art, in The Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others 19,
26 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Professional
Autonomy and the Social Control of Expertise, in The Sociology of the Professions:
Lawyers, Doctors and Others, supra, at 38, 42; see also Robert L. Nelson & David M.
Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in
Context, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American
Legal Profession 177,180-82 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
31. Larson, supra note 20, at 13; see also Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 40-
126, 226-33 (1989) (arguing that lawyers seek to control supply and demand for legal
services to enhance status and earning power); Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Civil
Law World, in 2 Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World 23 (Richard L. Abel &
Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); Nelson & Trubeck, Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices:
Transformations in the American Legal Profession, supra note 30; Richard L. Abel,
The Rise of Professionalism, 6 Brit. J.L. & Soc'y 82, 86-89 (1979) (reviewing Magali
Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (1977));
Freidson, supra note 30.
32. Larson, supra note 20, at 168-71.
33. Jerold Auerbach documents the disturbing strain of elitism in the history of
the bar's late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century professionalism project. See
Jerold Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 4-
5 (1976) ("Stratification enabled relatively few lawyers, concentrated in professional
associations, to legislate for the entire profession and to speak for the bar on issues of
professional and public consequence.... [Professional elites] wielded their power to
forge an identity between professional interest and their own political self-interest.");
see also Larson, supra note 20, at 173.
Post-functionalist sociology also accounts for role critics' suspicion that the
organized bar's promise of professional redemption through public service (i.e., pro
bono work and law reform) was merely a symbolic, rationalizing gesture of the
ideology of advocacy-a promise only as serious as necessary to stave off public
2003] 1405
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The watershed date for role critics is 1870.34  The industrial
revolution was under way; Langdell took the deanship at Harvard and
introduced the case method while propounding a formalist theory of
law; the Association of the Bar of the City of New York was formed
(soon to be followed by the American Bar Association ("ABA") in
1878); 35 and the business counselor began to replace the advocate in
elite law practice. The transition is personified for role critics in
figures like David Dudley Field who, after 1870, not only played an
infamous role in defending the first robber barons in the railroad wars
and Boss Tweed in the New York City corruption scandals, but also
openly reversed his stance on the moral obligations of the lawyer
when public scorn turned him into an icon of professional moral
bankruptcy.36
Even writers who appear to fall outside the standard discursive
domain of role criticism have accepted the basic framework of the
declension thesis. Thus in an article revealing the vigorous debate
over justice-centered and client-centered ethics in the drafting of the
intervention in professional life. See Abel, 2 Lawyers in Society, supra note 31, at 212-
18. For role critics, true redemption lies not in mollifying acts of public service at the
margins of an otherwise unapologetically client-centered profession, but rather in a
fundamental redefinition of role on the republican terms said to dominate before the
rise of corporate capital. See infra Part I.B.; see also Gordon, Independence of
Lawyers, supra note 10, at 22-23 (describing professional ideal of law reform
combined with adversary ethic as schizophrenic); Pearce, supra note 15 (detailing
ambitions of the professionalism project). The codes, from this vantage, appear more
as instruments for preserving professional monopoly and status than as any guarantee
of probity. See generally David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 158 n.7
(1988) (directing readers to additional sources that discuss this issue); Thomas D.
Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 702
(1977). Abel, 2 Lawyers in Society, supra note 31, at 218-22.
34. See, e.g., Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 10, at 74; Gordon, New York City
Lawyers, supra note 10, at 54; M.H. Hoeflich, Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century:
The "Other Tradition," 47 Kan. L. Rev. 793, 814-17 (1999); Schudson, supra note 20,
at 193 ("1 want to suggest that by the 1870's leading American lawyers were coming to
espouse a responsibility to their clients as their primary and even exclusive moral
obligation as lawyers."). But see Pearce, supra note 15, at 395-407 (thoughtfully
arguing that the descent into the narrow adversary ethic was not complete until 1960,
but otherwise endorsing the view that the profession gradually shifted away from civic
republicanism in the decades after 1870).
35. On the formation of the A.B.C.N.Y., see Schudson, supra note 20, at 202;
Gordon, New York City Lawyers, supra note 10, at 56.
36. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 15. On Field's reversal, see An Ex-Governor's
Theory of a Lawyer's Duty, in 2 Speeches, Arguments, and Miscellaneous Papers of
David Dudley Field 346, 349 (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884); Miscellaneous Addresses and
Papers on Law Reform, in 1 Speeches, Arguments, and Miscellaneous Papers of
David Dudley Field, supra, at 484, 489, 497, 541, 545; The True Lawyer (Aug. 28,
1889), in 3 Speeches, Arguments, and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field
399, 403 (Titus Munson Coan ed., 1890); Charles Francis Adams, Jr. & Henry Adams,
Chapters of Erie (1956); Schudson, supra note 20, at 193; see also Gordon, New York
City Lawyers, supra note 10, at 56-57 (observing that the professional
organization/reform movement was partly animated by the elite corporate bar's
desire for "a cure for their own condition"); Hoeflich, supra note 34, at 81.5-16.
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1908 ABA Canons of Professional Responsibility, Susan Carle
contends that this debate was only possible after a paradigm shift
broke the profession out of its civic republican mold at the end of the
nineteenth century:
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the doubts...
acknowledged on the duty-to-do-justice issue had grown into a full-
scale "paradigm shift" in legal ethics thinking, at least within the
more cosmopolitan sectors of the bar. Influenced by new
jurisprudential models that began to replace a religiously motivated
jurisprudence, legal ethics thinkers began to endorse the view that
justice would emerge as a matter of course from the working of the
system, and that the lawyer, as one player in this system, should
concern himself solely with playin7 his role as an advocate in order
for this process to work effectively.
B. Redemption Through Moral Activism
For role critics, the declension thesis runs straight through to
contemporary law practice. Modern ethical codes and professional
ideology are dominated by the concept of amoral, zealous advocacy,
they charge, and this very conception of the role is to blame for the
internally and externally degraded state of the profession. Internally,
lawyers are said to be alienated by the demands of their role,
mortified by the sort of person lawyering turns them into. Externally,
they are reviled for contributing to the moral delinquency of their
clients and for failing to meet even the diminished public duties the
profession still espouses.3"
The solution, role critics insist, is to shift from the adversary ethic
back to a principle of personal accountability akin to the nineteenth-
century justice-centered vision of the role. Here the normative social
function of morally activist civic republicanism crystallizes into mythic
form and even folk heroism. In arguing for what he calls the
"Lysistratian prerogative" (the lawyer's right and duty "to withhold
services from those of whose projects he disapproves" on moral
37. Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the
1908 Canons, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1, 13 (1999); see also Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as
Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 2009, 2038, 2046
(1990) (reviewing Lawyers in Society (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds.,
1988)); William H. Rehnquist, The Lawyer-Statesmen in American History, 9 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 537, 554 (1986). Carle adds that the paradigm shift "corresponded
roughly with the introduction of positivism and scientific models of the legal system in
American jurisprudence" that enabled ethicists to "disavow[] any.., connection
between law and morality." Carle, supra at 13; cf. Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering
the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241 (1992)
(arguing that the 1908 Canons imported civic republican values).
38. For a summary of role critics' claims regarding contemporary practice, see
Spaulding, supra note 4, at 45. The account below of role critics' normative call for a
revival of civic republican moral activism is drawn from the same source.
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grounds3 9), David Luban invokes Abraham Lincoln's famous
admonition to a client in his Springfield law practice:
Yes, we can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole
neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and
her six fatherless children and thereby get you six hundred dollars to
which you seem to have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it
appears to me, as much to the woman and her children as it does to
you. You must remember that some things legally right are not
morally right. We shall not take your case, but will give you a little
advice for which we will charge you nothing. You seem to be a
sprightly, energetic man; we would advise you to try your hand at
making six hundred dollars in some other way.41
Lincoln's decision empitomizes, for Luban, the role of the virtuous
lawyer operating according to a principle of moral accountability.
And lawyers responsible for the ends their clients pursue, Luban
continues, will necessarily become "moral activists."
41
Similarly, William Simon invokes both David Hoffman's 1817
Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment and George
Sharswood's 1854 Essay on Professional Ethics to support his
argument that "[l]awyers should take those actions that, considering
the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to
promote justice."42 Simon observes that
[t]he Dominant View has never been unchallenged within the
profession, and it seems not [to] have become dominant until the
late nineteenth century. The most prominent view in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries emphasized public
responsibility and complex normative judgment in a manner
resembling the view I argue for ....
Robert Gordon also explicitly locates his ideal of independence for
lawyers ("the notion that ... [t]he loyalty purchased by the client is
39. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper,
1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 637, 642.
40. Id. at 637 (quoting H. Herndon & J. Weik, 2 Herndon's Lincoln 345n.
(Chicago: Belford, Clarke & Co., 1899)).
41. Luban, supra note 33, at 160. Luban elaborates:
Anything except the most trivial peccadillo that is morally wrong for a
nonlawyer to do on behalf of another person is morally wrong for a lawyer
to do as well. The lawyer's role carries no special privileges and
immunities.... I do not see why a lawyer's decision not to assist a client in a
scheme that the lawyer finds nefarious is any different from ... other
instances of social control through private noncooperation .... [N]othing
permits a lawyer to discard her discretion or relieves her of the necessity of
asking whether a client's project is worthy of a decent person's service.
Id. at 154,169,174.
42. Simon, supra note 18, at 63, 138; see also Kenney Hegland, Quibbles, 67 Tex.
L. Rev. 1491, 1494-95 (1989) (invoking Hoffman and agreeing with Simon's
purposivism at least with respect to the means a lawyer employs for her clients).
43. Simon, supra note 18, at 63 (citing Hoffman and Sharswood); see also Luban,
supra note 33, at 10 (invoking Hoffman).
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limited, because a part of the lawyer's professional persona must be
set aside for dedication to public purposes") in "the traditional
'republican' ideal of the lawyers' public role. '44
Needless to say, the argument to revive lawyers' public
accountability as a remedy for structural flaws in the adversary ethic
gains special force by linking it to a lost tradition. Redemption
through moral activism appears both more plausible than other
alternatives, and more necessary, once tied to the ideology of heroic
lawyer-statesmen who fought the revolution, framed the Constitution
and worked to save the Union. The call for moral activism gains, in
short, the normative force of myth-all the more powerful because
clothed in the fabric of the real.
II. THE HOFFMAN-SHARSWOOD NEXUS
To pierce this myth, we must begin with the figures role critics have
used to build it. Role critics rely almost exclusively on the work of
David Hoffman of Baltimore, and George Sharswood of Philadelphia,
to show the prevalence of a morally activist republican ethic in early
and mid-nineteenth-century thought. Both men merit closer
examination.45
44. Gordon, Independence of Lawyers, supra note 10, at 13-14; see also Alan
Goldman, The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics 138-39 (1980); Kronman,
supra note 12, at 123-47; Patterson, supra note 29, at 969; Shaffer, Adversary Ethic,
supra note 24, at 701 n.18 ("'Republican' legal ethics refers to the legal ethics that
came from the two generations of American lawyers who fashioned a common-law
jurisprudence for America from colonial legal practice and the communitarian
idealism of our revolution.... An example of principle in republican legal ethics ... is
the republican lawyer's reluctance to plead, against civil actions, defenses that do not
address the merits of the plaintiff's claim-for example, statutes of limitation, the
claim of infancy, or the Statute of Frauds." (citing Hoffman and Sharswood)). There
are other role critics who do not specifically invoke the republican ideal in arguing for
moral activism. See Rhode, supra note 10, at 66-80; Gerald J. Postema, Moral
Responsibility in Professional Ethics, in Ethics and the Legal Profession, supra note
11, at 158, 171-72; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan.
L. Rev. 589 (1985); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, in Ethics and the Legal Profession, supra note 11, at 114, 122.
45. At least one historian, in an explicit attempt to bolster Shaffer's claims, has
pushed beyond Hoffman and Sharswood to suggest that civic republican legal ethics
enjoyed a broader base. See Hoeflich, supra note 34, at 794. And a handful of
scholars have at least briefly noted that there is evidence running counter to the
morally activist civic republican ethic. See Papke, supra note 11, at 35 ("As early as
the 1830s, some lawyers argued that the profession's primary ethical responsibility
was loyalty to the will of clients." (citing editors of The Law Reporter and,
interestingly, George Sharswood));Pearce, supra note 15, at 392-93 ("Although
dominant among the legal elite, the republican notion of lawyers was not the only
conception of the American lawyer's role.... [M]any 'rank and file' lawyers viewed
themselves in practical terms that denied the distinction between a business and a
profession, the foundation of the lawyer's governing class role." (emphasis added));
Pearce, supra note 37, at 249 (acknowledging that "[a]t the forefront of debate within
and outside the profession were questions regarding whether law was a business or a
profession and whether a lawyer should serve as a 'hired gun' for clients" (citing
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A. David Hoffman: Civic Republican or Moral Extremist?
Hoffman published his fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment as part of a two volume Course of Legal Study. First
published in 1817, the book sets out an extended, heavily annotated
syllabus of readings to prepare the young lawyer for law practice.46
The republican thematics of the book are unmistakable. First,
Hoffman embraces the concept of the lawyer as a virtuous citizen
entrusted with the highest tasks of governance.47 Working from the
premise that "law as a moral science is without doubt based ... on the
soundest systems of moral philosophy, and of metaphysics," the book
begins not with common law or an introduction to legislation, but
rather with an ambitious set of readings in moral and political
philosophy.4" "To be great in the law," he contends, "it is essential
that we should be great in every virtue,"49 and so the Course of Study
is structured not simply to train competent lawyers, but to form good
Bloomfield, supra note 24, at 99-116, Bloomfield, infra note 59, and Perry Miller, The
Life of the Mind in America (1965))); Schudson, supra note 20, at 206 n.29 (noting
that "[iun the 1830's and 1840's there were voices within the legal profession on both
sides of the question of the lawyer's obligation to his client," but emphasizing that
client-centered lawyering was "by no means settled 'tradition' in ante-bellum
America"). Hoeflich, however, relies on a relatively narrow base beyond Hoffman
and Sharswood: lawyers mainly from Philadelphia (where the holdover of Quaker
values may have impacted elites' attitudes on law practice); clergy, whose views on
the morality of law practice are, to say the least, predictable; and eulogies for lawyer
statesmen, in which the discourse is likely to have been more generous, more
aspirational, and less objective than other more dispassionate fora for discourse on
the subject of law and morality. The passing acknowledgement of other authors such
as Papke, Pearce, and Schudson has served more to strengthen their own arguments
for the dominance of civic republicanism than to make way for a serious consideration
of the evidence undercutting that ethic. As Part III details, it was not merely "rank
and file" lawyers or Jacksonian rabble-rousers who defended the adversary ethic, but
legal elites-prominent lawyers, scholars, and judges, some of whom were trained by
proponents of the "governing class" ideology.
46. David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study, Addressed to Students and the
Profession Generally (2d ed. 1836) (1817) [hereinafter Course]. "Extended" is
actually an understatement. The Course begins with the Bible, and Hoffman
expected the full course would require no less than six to seven years to complete-all
before entering an office apprenticeship. At a time when courts admitted lawyers
with little or no formal training, Hoffman's course was radically ambitious, though not
inconsistent with the views of other legal elites who advocated prescribed periods of
study and liberal education prior to admission to the bar. See 2 Chroust, supra note
24, at 173-223 (detailing late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century approaches to
training for the practice of law). The trend appears to have begun in earnest with
James Kent's An Introductory Lecture to a Course of Law Lectures, delivered at
Columbia College in 1794. See Kent's Introductory Lecture, reprinted in 3 Colum. L.
Rev. 330 (1903) [hereinafter Kent's Lecture]. Indeed, Hoffman's work reads like a
remarkably close elaboration of the principles for university law training Kent sets
out in his Introductory Lecture.
47. On the republican view of virtue, see White, supra note 14, at 53.
48. 1 Course, supra note 46, at 103.
49. Id. at 26-27.
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men. Invoking the republican principles of Roman orators, Hoffman
adds:
If the opinion of Quintilian, Cato, Longinus, and others among the
ancients, be correct, that no one can be an orator who is not a good
man, it may be applied with still more force to the lawyer, whose
vocation is the protection of the injured and the innocent, the
defence of the weak and the poor, the conservation of the rights and
prosperity of the citizen, and the vigorous maintenance of the
legitimate and wholesome powers of government, whose vocation,
in the language of justice Blackstone, "is the science which
distinguishes the criterions of right and wrong; which teaches to
establish the one, and prevent, punish, or redress the other; which
employs in its theory the noblest faculties of the soul, and exerts in
its practice, the cardinal virtues of the heart .... 50
Virtue is so essential to Hoffman because he believes the lawyering
role is defined by the solemn obligation to exercise moral judgment.
Lawyers, according to his view, are to restrain their clients from
pursuing an unjust cause even if that means usurping the role of judge
and jury. Indeed, at least three resolutions explicitly endorse the view
of the lawyer as judge of his client's cause.
In Resolution 12, Hoffman writes, "I will never plead the Statute of
Limitations, when based on the mere efflux of time; for if my client is
conscious he owes the debt; and has no other defence than the legal
bar, he shall never make me a partner in his knavery."51 He adds in
the next resolution that "although... the law has given the defence,
and contemplates... to induce claimants to a timely prosecution of
their rights... I shall claim to be the sole judge (the pleas not being
compulsory) of the occasions proper for their use."52
Resolution 14 claims more broadly that, in civil cases, the lawyer
must disregard a client's wishes if the lawyer decides the case is
factually, legally, or morally wanting:
My client's conscience, and my own, are distinct entities: and though
my vocation may sometimes justify my maintaining as facts, or
principles, in doubtful cases, what may be neither one nor the other,
I shall ever claim the privilege of solely judging to what extent to go.
In civil cases, if I am satisfied from the evidence that the fact is
against my client, he must excuse me if I do not see as he does, and
50. Id. at 26; see also id. at 27 ("Quintilian... is firmly of the opinion ... not only
that an orator ought to be a good man, but that no one can be an orator unless he be
such. He urges, therefore, that 'morality should be the orator's favourite study, and
he should be thoroughly acquainted with the whole discipline of honesty and
justice .... '); 2 id. at 610, 740; see also Kent's Lecture, supra note 46, at 338-39;
Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role Model for Early American Lawyers: A Case Study in
Classical "Influence," 73 Classical J. 313 (1978).
51. 2 Course, supra note 46, at 754.
52. Id. at 754-55 (in the omitted text, Hoffman insists that he will not plead
infancy as a defense to a contract his client presently possesses the ability to pay).
20031 1411
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
do not press it: and should the principle also be wholly at variance
with sound law, it would be dishonourable folly in me to endeavor to
incorporate it into the jurisprudence of the country, when, if
successful, it would be a gangrene that might bring death to my
cause of the succeeding day.
Finally (and less controversially, relative to the contemporary law of
lawyering54 ), in Resolution 31, Hoffman emphasizes the lawyer's duty
to express his full moral and legal judgment when asked for opinions:
All opinions for clients, verbal, or written, shall be my opinions,
deliberately and sincerely given, and never venal and flattering
offerings to their wishes, or their vanity. And though clients
sometimes have the folly to be better pleased with having their
views confirmed by an erroneous opinion, than their wishes or hopes
thwarted by a sound one, yet such an assentation is dishonest and
unprofessional. Counsel, in giving opinions, whether they perceive
this weakness in their clients or not, should act as judges, responsible
to God and to man, as also especially to their employers, to advise
them soberly, discretely, and honestly, to the best of their ability-
though the certain consequence be the loss of large prospective
gains. 55
Hoffman thus would insist on pressing his personal judgment
regarding a client's proposed course of action even where the client
seeks an exclusively legal opinion. Indeed, a strict line between the
two does not exist for him. And his willingness to sacrifice pecuniary
gain for a higher good is the quintessence of republican virtue
conceived as an "ideology of restraint. '56
Hoffman's exhortation for lawyers to play a judicial role is also
implicit in a number of other resolutions. 57 The resolution on criminal
defense is particularly noteworthy for its denunciation of zealous
advocacy:
When employed to defend those charged with crimes of the deepest
dye, and the evidence against them, whether legal, or moral, be such
as to leave no just doubt of their guilt, I shall not hold myself
privileged, much less obliged, to use my endeavors to arrest, or to
53. Id. at 755.
54. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.4 & R. 2.1 (2002).
55. 2 Course, supra note 46, at 764.
56. The phrase is adapted from G. Edward White. See White, supra note 14, at 50
("[Republican] ideology was essentially one of restraint. The concept of virtue
subordinated individual self-interest to the good of society as a whole .... ).
57. See, e.g., 2 Course, supra note 46, at 754 (Resolution 10) (insisting that a
lawyer should withdraw if client insists on "captious requisitions, or frivolous and
vexatious defences"); id. (Resolution 11) (insisting that a lawyer should "promptly
advise [a client] to abandon" a claim or defense if "after duly examining [the] case"
the lawyer believes it "cannot, or rather ought not, to be sustained"); id. at 765(Resolution 33) ("What is wrong, is not the less so from being common.... What is
morally wrong, cannot be professionally right, however it may be sanctioned by time
or custom.").
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impede the course of justice, by special resorts to ingenuity-to the
artifices of eloquence-to appeals to the morbid and fleeting
sympathies of weak juries, or of temporizing courts-to my own
personal weight of character-nor finally, to any of the overweening
influences I may possess, from popular manners, eminent talents,
exalted learning, [etc.] Persons of atrocious character, who have
violated the laws of God and man, are entitled to no such special
exertions from any member of our pure and honourable profession;
and indeed, to no intervention beyond securing to them a fair and
dispassionate investigation of the facts of their cause, and the due
application of the law: all that goes beyond this, either in manner or
substance, is unprofessional, and proceeds, either from a mistaken
view of the relation of client and counsel, or from some unworthy and
selfish motive, which sets a higher value on professional display and
success, than on truth and justice, and the substantial interests of the
community.
58
Here, as elsewhere for Hoffman, moral probity is definitive of the role
and the client's interests are unequivocally subservient to the interests
of justice.
Like other republican legal elites, Hoffman also believed that law
should be conceived and taught as a science and that only such an
approach would ensure the production of lawyers qualified to play
their special role in society. "Law," he argues, is "the system which
regulates the moral relations of man .... How restricted, therefore, is
that view which estimates jurisprudence in the light of a mere
collection of positive rules and institutions! ... If law be a science and
really deserve so sublime a name, it must be founded on principle, and
claim an exalted rank in the empire of reason .... The lawyer
restricted to desultory reading and memorization of decisional law in
58. Id. at 755-56 (emphasis added). The idea of a lawyer defeating the conviction
or due sentence of a person in cases of moral turpitude was clearly abhorrent to
Hoffman-he could not resist elaborating:
Such an inordinate ambition, I shall ever regard as a most dangerous
perversion of talents, and a shameful abuse of an exalted station. The
parricide, the gratuitous murderer, or other perpetrator of like revolting
crimes, has surely no such claim on the commanding talents of the
profession, whose object and pride should be the suppression of all vice, by
the vindication and enforcement of the laws. Those, therefore, who wrest
their proud knowledge from its legitimate purposes, to pollute the streams of
justice, and to screen such foul offenders from merited penalties, should be
regarded by all, (and certainly shall be by me,) as ministers at a holy altar,
full of high pretension, and apparent sanctity, but inwardly base, unworthy,
and hypocritical-dangerous in the precise ratio of their commanding
talents, and exalted learning.
Id. at 756-57.
59. 1 Course, supra note 46. at 24-25; see also Maxwell Bloomfield, David
Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal Culture, 38 Md. L. Rev. 673, 680
(1979). On the various antebellum approaches to law, scientifically conceived, see
Howard Schweber, The "Science" of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences
in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 Law & Hist. Rev. 421 (1999).
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a law office would never, Hoffman warns, reach the principles
fundamental to high level legal analysis and so essential to sound
argument on the extension of common law to American conditions
and the elaboration of the Constitution: "How intimately are all the
sciences connected, and how much mistaken is the idea entertained by
many in this country, that the lawyer (whose province is reasoning,)
can attain to eminence, though he restricts his inquiries within the
visible boundaries of his peculiar science, chiefly as it is found in the
treatises of municipal law .... [I]f a lawyer has the ambition to aim at
the most elevated rank in his profession, he must carry his researches
much beyond the vulgar limits of municipal law."6"' As an anonymous
reviewer emphasizes in an 1830 article for the North American
Review on Hoffman's book,
when the question is about forming able advocates, wise judges, and
perspicacious lawgivers, it is plain that this ordinary education will
do no longer. When the file affords no precedent; when we are to
travel out of the record; when the index presents no case in point,
we are obliged to revert to first principles, and spin for ourselves
that thread of ingenious deduction, which is not ready made to our
hands. It is this kind of legal education that our author
contemplates .... 61
Hoffman was so enthralled with the promise of law, scientifically
conceived, that he argues students will be drawn to a higher standard
of conduct by the sheer force of their studies: "We believe that, in
most cases, enlarged knowledge and noble studies exercise so happy an
influence on those who have addicted themselves to them, that
treatises and precepts on mere manner and conduct become
comparatively unnecessary to such minds .... [T]he scientific mind is
always supposed to derive, from the complexion of its pursuits, more
correct, more enlarged, and more honorable views, than one of more
circumscribed knowledge. 6
60. 1 Course, supra note 46, at 104; see Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 10, at
97 (describing Whig-Federalist conception of legal science).
61. Anonymous, David Hoffnan, Legal Outlines, Being the Substance of a Course
of Lectures Now Delivering in the University of Maryland, 30 N. Am. Rev. 135, 137-38
(1830). The reviewer shared Hoffman's view of legal science as a method of deriving
the first principles of law "from which we must commence all our learning"-
principles that have their roots in "that necessary and eternal justice which we call the
law of nature." Id. at 141; see also Joseph Story, David Hoffrnan: A Course of Legal
Study Respectfully Addressed to the Students of Law in the United States, 6 N. Am.
Rev. 45, 48, 57 (1818) (noting with approval that a "spirit of scientifick research has
diffused itself over the ... departments of the common law .... A philosophical spirit
of investigation now pervades the bar and the bench, and we are freed from the blind
pedantry and technical quibbles of the old schools"); id. at 77 (concluding of
Hoffman's book that "[n]o work can sooner dissipate the common delusion, that the
law may be thoroughly acquired in the immethodical, interrupted and desultory
studies of the office of a practising counsellor").
62. 2 Course, supra note 46, at 723; see also id. at 744.
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Finally, Hoffman appears to embrace the republican conviction that
law practice should be dominated by an exclusive elite-that sound
practice of the science demands a class worthy of the power it confers
and the labor it exacts. He writes that "[a] science so liberal and
extended, so dignified and important, should be cultivated by those
alone, who are actuated by the principles of the purest and most
refined honour.6 3  As G. Edward White has argued, Hoffman's
Course of Study fits squarely within the discourse of "a new class of
lawyers-elite commentators-who defined their role as educating the
profession and the public in the 'science' of law. ' The educational
project, derived from a scientific conception of law, was but one
aspect of a multi-pronged effort in the early stages of the nineteenth
century to respond to several problems facing the profession: (1)
pervasive anti-lawyer sentiment (which remained constant even as the
demand for legal services grew),65 (2) the paucity of distinctively
American legal authority to guide judicial decision, (3) the dangers to
the republican vision posed by an increasingly rapacious and
commercially oriented populace, and (4) the legislative destruction of
formal standards for admission to the practice of law. As White
asserts, elite legal commentators "self-consciously set out not only to
respond to the increased demand for legal sources, specifically in the
systematization and publication of legal rules and doctrines, but also
to establish themselves as professional guardians of republican
principles, persons whose special knowledge of 'legal science' enabled
them to recast law in conformity with the assumptions of republican
government."66
Even if it is beyond peradventure that Hoffman's Course of Study
reflects the values of republican ideology, it is far from clear that his
Resolutions on Professional Deportment (his effort to translate those
values into a code of ethics) are representative either of practice at the
63. 1 id. at 26; see also Bloomfield, supra note 59, at 681-82 ("[Tlhe adjustment of
ideal norms to passing realities was a delicate business at best, to be entrusted only to
skilled professionals--including, of course, that band of scientifically trained lawyers
whom he and other legal educators were laboring to create.").
64. White, supra note 14, at 79.
65. The standard anti-lawyer tracts were Jesse Higgins, Sampson Against the
Philistines, or the Reformation of Lawsuits; and Justice Made Cheap, Speedy, and
Brought Home to Every Man's Door: Agreeably to the Principles of the Ancient Trial
By Jury, Before the Same Was Innovated by Judges and Lawyers (Phil., 1805); William
Manning The Key of Liberty (1799), reprinted in The Life and Democratic Writings of
William Manning, "A Laborer," 1747-1814 (Michael Merrill & Sean Wilentz eds.,
1993); George Watterston, The Lawyer, or Man as He Ought Not to Be (1808); P.W.
Grayson, Vice Unmasked, An Essay: Being a Consideration of the Influence of Law
Upon the Moral Essence of Man, with Other Reflections, New York 1830, in The Legal
Mind in America: From Independence to the Civil War 191 (Perry Miller ed., 1962);
Benjamin Austin Honestus, Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law
(1786), reprinted in 13 Am. J. Legal Hist. 241, 244 (1969); see also Bloomfield, supra
note 24, at 32-58; Friedman, supra note 8, at 303-04.
66. White, supra note 14, at 79. For his discussion of Hoffman, see id. at 87-95.
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time or the consensus of republican legal elites on the specific legal
duties entailed by their self-appointed role as the "governing class."
Role critics have treated Hoffman as though he stood at the center of
a republican ideal of morally activist lawyering, but on this very
question he may properly belong at the margin-as the exponent of a
rather extreme version of that ideal. I examine authors who offered
alternative definitions of the lawyer's role in Part III, but it is worth
noting here aspects of his book and biography that problematize the
claim that Hoffman's Resolutions express the core of a lost tradition of
lawyering.
First, the Course of Study was originally published in 1817 without
the Resolutions, three years after Hoffman accepted an appointment
to teach law at the University of Maryland." The Resolutions were
not added until the second edition issued in 1836 when he resigned his
university position. 8 Since Hoffman abandoned his law lectures in
1832 due to low attendance, none of his own students were trained
using the Resolutions.6 9  Indeed, far from expressing then-prevailing
professional norms, Maxwell Bloomfield contends that the
Resolutions were a reaction against them-a post hoc "protest[]
against the debasement of professional mores that he perceived in the
Jacksonian era. 1' Bloomfield adds that Hoffman attempted to
implement his Resolutions "in his own practice, but was criticized for
impracticality and neglect of his clients' interests."'7' And after the
publication of the second edition, Hoffman departed the field
67. Bloomfield, supra note 59, at 678.
68. Id. at 683-84.
69. Id. at 682-83. To be fair, most lawyers who were invited to found university
law schools or teach law subjects at the time suffered from low attendance.
Chancellor Kent's travails at Columbia, for instance, are well known. His first series
of lectures went from thirty-six lawyers in 1794, to three (including his own clerk) the
following year, to none in the third year. He resigned the position in frustration in
1798. See Chroust, supra note 24, at 181-83; Friedman, supra note 8, at 322 ("[T]he
main path to practice.., went through apprenticeship, for the overwhelming majority
of lawyers."). But this places Hoffman, again, at the borders of early nineteenth-
century law training, rather than the core, since the vast majority of lawyers were not
trained in law schools. And Hoffman's lectures may have suffered, where others did
not, from lack of imagination and a rather stale sense of fun. Bloomfield argues that
his "gentility and cosmopolitan scholarship seemed anachronistic at best" to young
lawyers "born into a world of democratic hoopla and feverish technological change."
Bloomfield, supra note 59, at 687. For "rest" from the intense labors of law study, his
book prescribes "bathing ... partial ablutions, especially of the forehead, hands, and
wrists; frequent brushing of the hair; gentle walking in the streets; .. . even to seek
amusement in counting the tiles or bricks of neighbouring houses ... to muse over the
gaily decorated windows of the shops, and ... to ... speculate on the probable
etymology of the curious names so often presented on signs ...." I Course, supra
note 46, at 41-42. Even students not born into a world of democratic hoopla and
technological change may have found inspiration wanting in this approach.
70. Bloomfield, supra note 59, at 684.
71. Id. at 685.
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altogether-he "abandoned law for belles lettres and spent his
remaining years in fruitless attempts to write a best seller. 7 2
Second, other legal instructors, even those who endorsed a scientific
approach to law, generally omitted Hoffman's expansive moral and
humanistic curriculum, focusing instead on more narrow legal
principles. Bloomfield reports, for instance, that Joseph Story (to
whom the Course of Study is dedicated), sheared off nearly everything
from Hoffman's course except the readings in common law and the
Constitution soon after he adapted the curriculum for his lectures at
the nascent Harvard Law School.7 3 And in the most prominent
private law school of the period, run by Tapping Reeve in Litchfield,
Connecticut, the training was purely technical.74 Founded in 1784, the
Litchfield School graduated more than 1000 law students before
72. Id.; cf Chroust, supra note 24, at 218 (noting, without citation, that Hoffman
lectured at a new law school in Philadelphia from 1844 to 1847). Literary ambition
was hardly uncommon for lawyers of the period, see generally Robert A. Ferguson,
Law and Letters in American Culture (1984), but the circumstances of Hoffman's
retreat from law to literature are telling.
73. Bloomfield, supra note 59, at 687; Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 10, at
87; cf Warren, supra note 24, at 540 (asserting without citation that the 1817 Course
of Study was "for many years... the standard manual for law students").
74. See, e.g., Marian C. McKenna, Tapping Reeve and The Litchfield Law School
64 (1986) (listing the standard topics covered in lectures by Reeve and his teaching
partner James Gould); id. at 179-82 (describing laws and resolutions of the school);
Chroust, supra note 24, at 210-12 (describing Litchfield as "undoubtedly the most
important law school in America ... far into the nineteenth century"; reporting
subjects covered in student notebooks and quoting an 1829 advertiser on the school's
method of instruction in which there is no mention of ethics or humanistic studies);
see also Josiah Quincy, An Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Dane Law
College in Harvard University, October 23, 1832, in The Legal Mind in America, From
Independence to the Civil War, supra note 65, at 201, 206. This is not to say that
Hoffman stood entirely alone, at least among university law faculty, in including
professional ethics in the curriculum. Benjamin Butler's 1835 program for the new
law school at the University of the City of New York included lectures on "Forensic
Duties and Professional Ethics" in the third year-though Butler's ethical
prescriptions are significantly less elaborate and less morally activist than Hoffman's.
See Benjamin F. Butler, A Plan for the Organization of a Law School in the University
of the City of New York (1835), reprinted in The Gladsome Light of Jurisprudence:
Learning the Law in England and the United States in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries 165, 174-76 (Michael H. Hoeflich ed., 1988). On the broader project of
antebellum university legal education, see Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary
Idea of University Legal Education, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 527 (1990), Paul D.
Carrington, A Tale of Two Lawyers, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 615 (1997), Paul D.
Carrington, Teaching Law and Virtue at Transylvania University: The George Wythe
Tradition in the Antebellum Years, 41 Mercer L. Rev. 673 (1990), Paul D. Carrington,
The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political Ethics of Francis Lieber,
42J. Legal Educ. 339, 348-49 (1992) (noting that while the Revolutionary generation
"was animated by concern for moral education to nurture the traits of republican
virtue.... many of those who shared in the endeavor of teaching law to promote
public virtue or disinterest would have acknowledged that their aim was ill-defined
and perhaps problematic. If some doubted even the possibility of public virtue, others
were unclear about its meaning and all must have been uncertain as to how that
quality might be transmitted to unruly youth."), Davison M. Douglas, The
Jeffersonian Vision of Legal Education, 51 J. Legal Educ. 185 (2001).
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closing in 1833. Its students not only "hailed from every state of the
Union" (a dramatic accomplishment for the time), they became the
"governing class" of legal elites par excellence. Anton-Hermann
Chroust reports that "2 became Vice-Presidents of the United States,
3 became Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States; 34 sat
on the highest courts of their states, including 16 Chief Justices or
Chancellors; 28 became United States Senators; 101 were elected to
the House of Representatives; 14 became governors of their states; 6
served in the federal Cabinet; and 3 became college presidents."75 Yet
professional ethics had no visible place in the standard curriculum
except perhaps insofar as the cases taught reflected norms embedded
in contemporary practice and procedure.
As a personal protest against the perceived evils of Jacksonian
democracy, however, Hoffman's Resolutions become more
understandable. Bloomfield observes that Hoffman was a devout,
highly educated son of a prosperous Baltimore mercantile family, and
a proud member of the Baltimore bar, which "was notorious for both
eccentricity and affectation." Bloomfield continues:
Having survived the Revolution with no appreciable loss of prestige
or power, Maryland's attorneys showed little inclination to treat the
average client as an equal. While the legal community in Baltimore
grew from sixteen in 1779 to forty-three in 1810, no corresponding
democratization of personnel or mores took place. Most of the new
practitioners were the sons of merchants or gentry, who strove to
emulate the courtly manners and lavish life style of such bar leaders
as William Pinkney and Robert Goodloe Harper.... The
acknowledged competence of Baltimore's practitioners in the early
nineteenth century led one local enthusiast to assert that his city's
bar was "the ablest of our country, and by far the haughtiest." 76
Hoffman was thus situated in rarified professional air. And for just
this reason, his sharp response to the "leveling process" that threw
into doubt the "traditional society of the late eighteenth century [and]
its cohesive elite leadership, ' 77 gives the Resolutions an idiosyncratic,
reactive, even wistful tone.8
Role critics have also ignored the extent to which "Hoffman's
approach to legal ethics, like his jurisprudence generally, was steeped
in religious conviction. '79  The Course of Study opens with a
"Student's Prayer,"8"' and his annotations to the readings prescribed in
75. Chroust, supra note 24, at 214.
76. Bloomfield, supra note 59, at 677 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 684.
78. Susan Carle is more blunt, characterizing the Resolutions as "argumentative,
defensive, and more than a little bombastic." Carle, supra note 37, at 12.
79. Id. at 11. Carle goes so far as to label it "religious jurisprudence." See also
Schweber, supra note 59, at 446-48 (discussing role of "natural theology" in the legal
theory of Hoffman and other university-based law teachers).
80. 1 Course, supra note 46, at 49.
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the Bible emphasize that "[t]he purity and sublimity of the morals of
the Bible have at no time been questioned; it is the foundation of the
common law of every christian nation. The christian religion is a part
of the law of the land, and, as such, should certainly receive no
inconsiderable portion of the lawyer's attention.""1 Strong religious
faith not only renders law and morality inseparable for Hoffman,82 it
seems to have given him a profound confidence in the capacity of
properly trained lawyers to make correct moral judgments about the
justice or injustice of the law and their clients' legal objectives. In the
preface to the Resolutions he says he believes that "in most cases one
of the disputants is knowingly in the wrong."83 Thus while a lawyer
may be tempted by the interests and passions that animate those who
wish to bring unjust suits, Hoffman was confident that religion,
morals, and the "elevated honour" which scientific law study provokes
will normally forestall the lawyer's corruption. 4
On each of these grounds-his reactive motivation for drafting the
Resolutions, the singularity of his heavily moral and interdisciplinary
approach to scientific law teaching, his membership in an insular,
hyper-elite bar, and his religiously based objectivism on legal ethics-
we have occasion to question whether Hoffman's thoroughgoing
commitment to moral activism in lawyering in fact speaks for the
''governing class" of lawyers in the early nineteenth century.
B. George Sharswood-Moral Activism or Moral Skepticism?
Sharswood was born in Philadelphia in 1810. After graduating from
the Classics Department at the University of Pennsylvania, he
apprenticed under Joseph R. Ingersoll, a prominent member of the
Philadelphia bar. Once in law practice, he developed into a classic
lawyer statesman, three times serving in the state legislature, quickly
ascending to the bench and accepting, at age 40, an appointment to
teach law at his alma mater. He served as Chief Justice of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court from 1879 until just before his death in
1883."5 His Essay on Professional Ethics, which went through five
editions and was circulated along with excerpts from Hoffman's
Resolutions to the ABA committee charged with drafting the 1908
Canons,86 was adapted from a Compend of Lectures on the Aims and
Duties of the Profession of the Law delivered before the law class of
the University of Pennsylvania in 1854.87
81. Id. at 65.
82. See Bloomfield, supra note 59, at 680-81; Carle, supra note 37, at 11.
83. 2 Course, supra note 46, at 746.
84. Id. at 747.
85. See generally Memorial, in Hon. George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional
Ethics (5th ed. 1884).
86. See Carle, supra note 37, at 9.
87. Memorial, in Sharswood, supra note 85.
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The view of the role expressed in Sharswood's Essay on
Professional Ethics is more complex than David Hoffman's in a
number of respects, and this complexity has produced interpretive
dissonance among role critics and other scholars. At least one
commentator has argued that the essay endorses a client-centered
theory of the role;"8 others counter that it fits squarely within the
republican justice-centered tradition; 9 and a few, moved by the
internal tensions of the essay, claim that it presents a middle position
between the extreme moral activism of Hoffman and the radically
client-centered maxim offered by Lord Henry Brougham in a speech
before the House of Lords in 1820."' The interpretive dissonance
alone is reason enough to question the coherence of the declension
thesis and the dominance of civic republican moral activism among
antebellum lawyers. But by and large, role critics have ignored this
dissonance, lumping Sharswood together with Hoffman and
"depict[ing] a smooth process in the transmission of legal ethics
doctrines" through the nineteenth century.9'
Interpretive dissonance exists for good reason. The Essay both
reflects and resists the republican premises that animate Hoffman's
Resolutions. On the one hand, Sharswood embraces both the
scientific theory of law and the idea that lawyers bear special
obligations to governance as professional elites.92 On the other hand,
88. See Papke, supra note 11, at 38.
89. See Pearce, supra note 37, at 241; Simon, supra note 18, at 63.
90. See Carle, supra note 37, at 12-13; Hoeflich, supra note 34, at 803-07; see
generally Bloomfield, supra note 59, at 687; Patterson, supra note 29; see also Rhode,
supra note 10, at 71 (noting conflict between positions of Hoffman and Sharswood).
In his famous effort to defend Queen Caroline against charges of adultery brought on
behalf of George IV, Lord Brougham argued that "an advocate, in the discharge of his
duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that
client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and,
among them, to himself, is his first and only duty .... " Hoeflich, supra 34, at 795
(emphasis added); see Pearce, supra note 37, at 248 n.42 (citing David Mellinkoff, The
Conscience of a Lawyer 188-89 (1973), and noting that "Brougham's comments
implied a threat to reveal the King's previous secret marriage to a Roman Catholic,
which would potentially have thrown England into turmoil"). The context of the
speech, while often noted, is seldom considered as a reason to question whether the
maxim propounds a general theory of lawyering or is simply a rhetorical argument
designed to effectively meet the exigencies presented by Brougham's rather unique
client. Cf Charles P. Curtis, It's Your Law 6 (1954) (quoting Lord Brougham's
concession that "[t]he real truth is, that the statement was anything rather than a
deliberate and well-considered opinion. It was a menace, and it was addressed chiefly
to George IV"); Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics:
Text, Subtext, Context, 41 J. Legal Educ. 29 (1991).
91. Carle, supra note 37, at 9.
92. See Sharswood, supra note 85. at 26 ("From the ranks of the Bar, more
frequently than from any other profession, are men called to fill the highest public
stations in the service of the country, at home and abroad. The American lawyer
must thus extend his researches into all parts of' the science, which has for its object
human government and law; he must study it in its grand outlines as well as in the
filling up of details."); id. at 30 (same); id. at 53-54 (discussing obligation of bar in its
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he carefully distinguishes law from moral obligation,93 and assiduously
avoids any pretension to the kind of moral objectivism that enables
Hoffman to assume lawyers and clients will, in most cases, know who
stands in the right. On the latter point, Sharswood repeatedly
admonishes readers that questions regarding fidelity to client are "the
most difficult questions in the consideration of the duty of a lawyer,"94
and that even a lawyer's considered judgment on the justice of his
client's case may turn out to be incorrect.9" He answers the "common
accusation in the mouth of gainsayers against the profession ... [that]
there must be a right and a wrong side to every lawsuit," by insisting
that "[e]very case is to be decided, by the tribunal before which it is
brought for adjudication, upon the evidence, and upon the principles
of law applicable to the facts as they appear upon the evidence."96
And he warns that "it will often be hazardous to condemn either
client or counsel upon what appears only. A hard plea-a sharp
point-may subserve what is at bottom an honest claim, or just
defence; though the evidence may not be within the power of the
parties, which would make it manifest."97
This epistemological skepticism not only makes Hoffman's
confident moralism seem brazen by contrast, it directly affects
Sharswood's view of the lawyer's role. While the Essay offers
considered opinions on professional ethics, it stops well short of
prescribing a system of "Resolutions" to be internalized by the
practicing lawyer,98 and the opinions given are at least equivocal, if not
statesmanship capacity "to diffuse sound principles among the people, that they may
intelligently exercise the controlling power placed in their hands"); see generally
Pearce, supra note 15; Pearce, supra note 37.
93. See, e.g., Sharswood, supra note 85, at 47-48 (arguing for stare decisis on
ground that judicial decision according to principles of justice alone would produce
legal uncertainty and invite anarchy; "The law becomes a lottery, in which every man
feels disposed to try his chance."); id. at 77-78 (distinguishing between a lawyer's legal
obligation to clients, and his "wider" moral responsibility); id. at 82 ("No court or jury
are invested with any arbitrary discretion to determine a cause according to their
mere notions of justice. Such a discretion vested in any body of men would constitute
the most appalling of despotisms. Law, and justice according to law-this is the only
secure principle upon which the controversies of men can be decided."); id. at 83-84
(arguing that statute of limitations is a legal, if not always moral, defense).
94. Id. at 76; id. at 81 (admonishing that specifying the limit on a lawyer's duty of
zealous representation "is a problem by no means of easy solution"); id. at 89 ("It
may be delicate and dangerous ground to tread upon to undertake to descend to
particulars upon such a subject. Every case must, to a great degree, depend upon its
own circumstances, known, peradventure, to the counsel alone .... ).
95. See id. at 88 (quoting Sir Mathew Hale's observation that he changed his
practice of selecting cases according to his view of their justice when he discovered
that, on two occasions, cases that initially appeared "'very bad' turned out to be
"'really very good and just').
96. Id. at 81-82.
97. Id. at 89.
98. Hoffman's Fiftieth Resolution was to "read the foregoing forty-nine
resolutions, twice every year, during my professional life." 2 Course, supra note 46, at
775.
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internally conflicted. The client, he argues, is entitled to the lawyer's
"[e]ntire devotion," and to "warm zeal in the maintenance and
defence of his rights."99  The lawyer, moreover, "is not morally
responsible for the act of the party in maintaining an unjust cause, nor
for the error of the court, if they fall into error, in deciding it in his
favor," because parties have the right "to have every view presented
to the minds of the judges, which can legitimately bear upon the
question," and because the lawyer who refuses cases which appear
unjust "usurps the functions of both judge and jury." ' These two
principles-dedication to client service and ethical neutrality-are the
defining traits of adversarial advocacy."" Thus, if Sharswood had
stopped here, his essay would stand as a powerful counter to the
tradition of morally activist lawyering role critics say he exemplifies.
But just as soon as he enumerates these principles, Sharswood begs
off, emphasizing that most lawyers have taken them too far:
It by no means follows, however, as a principle of private action for
the advocate, that all causes are to be taken by him indiscriminately,
and conducted with a view to one single end, success. It is much to
be feared, however, that the prevailing tone of professional ethics
leads practically to this result. He has an undoubted right to refuse a
retainer, and decline to be concerned in any cause, at his
discretion."0 2
Sharswood then bifurcates the right to refuse representation by
distinguishing between suing and defending: on the one hand, a
lawyer (whether civil or criminal) should never prosecute a case he
believes to be unjust (since the office of lawyering would then be
"'degraded to that of a mercenary '"13), a lawyer for the defendant, on
the other hand, may use all his abilities to hold the plaintiff to the facts
and the law, even if he believes his client is culpable." 4 And in cases
99. Sharswood, supra note 85, at 78-79.
100. Id. at 83-84. Interestingly, Sharswood deduces the lawyer's non-accountability
not merely from the duty to client, but from the lawyer's status as an officer of the
court. The lawyer, he emphasizes, "is not merely the agent of the party." Id. at 83.
101. See Luban, The Adversary System, supra note 7, at 83; Simon, supra note 19;
Spaulding, supra note 4.
102. Sharswood, supra note 85, at 84.
103. Id. at 97 (quoting Chief Justice Gibson).
104. Compare id. at 93 (noting that aiding the state in a prosecution "ought never
to be done against the counsel's own opinion of its merits"), and id. at 96 ("[In civil
matters] counsel have an undoubted right, and are in duty bound, to refuse to be
concerned for a plaintiff in the legal pursuit of a demand, which offends his sense of
what is just and right [because] ... [t]he courts are open to the party in person to
prosecute his own claim, and plead his own cause." (emphasis added)), with id. at 90-
91 ("Every man, accused of an offence, has a constitutional right to a trial according
to law; even if guilty, he ought not to be convicted and undergo punishment unless
upon legal evidence; and with all the forms which have been devised for the security
of life and liberty.... He is entitled, therefore, to the benefit of counsel to conduct his
defense ... to suggest all those reasonable doubts which may arise from the evidence
as to his guilt, and to see that if he is convicted, it is according to law."), id. at 91
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where the defense lawyer believes justice is on the side of his client,
Sharswood endorses unchecked zeal-the lawyer may not only use all
his "ingenuity and eloquence" to ensure success, but may "fall back
upon the instructions of his client, and refuse to yield any legal
vantage-ground, which may have been gained through the ignorance
or inadvertence of his opponent."'' 5
Pearce has argued, and others have assumed, that on balance,
morally activist republican principles prevail over client-centered
values in this bifurcated scheme.) 6 Be that as it may, three things are
equally clear. First, Sharswood's endorsement of moral activism is far
more circumspect than Hoffman's, suggesting that a range of views on
the ethics of lawyering may have been thought consistent with
republican values. Second, his endorsement of moral activism is (as
we saw with Hoffman) more a reaction against than a reflection of,
prevailing professional norms. (Recall his "fear[]" that "the
prevailing tone of professional ethics leads practically" to the principle
that lawyers accept cases "indiscriminately... with a view to one
single end, success."' 7 ) Third, Sharswood's bifurcated scheme is
internally inconsistent. At least in civil cases, holding plaintiffs'
lawyers morally accountable for the causes they represent while
exempting defense lawyers is difficult to square with Sharswood's
skepticism about lawyers' ability to accurately prejudge the merits of
cases, his concerns about allowing lawyers to usurp the role of judge
and jury, and his emphasis on the importance of equal representation
by competent experts to the proper functioning of the adversary
process."' All of these points have been lost in role critics' haste to
present Hoffman and Sharswood as archetypical exponents of a
coherent republican theory of morally activist lawyering.
(arguing counsel must accept court appointment for a criminal defendant), and id. at
95 ("[A civil] defendant has a legal right to require that the plaintiff's demand against
him should be proved and proceeded with according to law.").
105. Id. at 96, 98; see also id. at 92.
106. Pearce, supra note 37, at 261-67.
107. Sharswood, supra note 85, at 84.
108. On the final point, Sharswood says:
If it were thrown upon the parties themselves, there would be a very great
inequality between them, according to their intelligence, education and
experience, respectively. Indeed, it is one of the most striking advantages of
having a learned profession, who engage as a business in representing parties
in courts of justice, that men are thus brought nearer to a condition of
equality, that causes are tried and decided upon their merits, and do not
depend upon the personal characters and qualifications of the immediate
parties.
Id. at 95. Although the statement comes just after Sharswood claims that civil
defendants have the right to a full defense, the argument plainly supports a right to
competent representation for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is also difficult to see
why, on the reasons Sharswood offers, the lawyer for a civil defendant who is clearly
liable should be held to a lower moral standard than the lawyer for a civil plaintiff
with an unjust claim. For both lawyers, justice is vindicated by refusing to press their
clients' claims, yet Sharswood contends that the defense lawyer may forge ahead.
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III. THE SENTINEL AS MERCENARY
The proper place to try causes is before the properly constituted
tribunals; and although every man of character, under our system,
may to a certain extent select his causes and refuse retainers, yet the
sober truth is, that the more mercenary our profession is, the more it
will deserve respect, and conduce to the safety of the citizen and the
welfare of society ....
- Peleg W. Chandler (1846)
The true lawyer, imbued with lessons of wisdom, and accustomed to
labor in all that ennobles the soul and refines the mind and chastens
the feelings, is one of the ornaments of his race. The vindicator of
the laws of God and man; a guardian of morality and conservator of
right; the distributor of justice and the protector of the injured and
the innocent; a public sentinel to sound the alarm on the approach
of danger; he is one of the firmest safeguards of society. His
profession is one of transcendent dignity.
- James Jackson (1846)
There are several rather striking facts about these quotations.
While they appear diametrically opposed-one embracing the concept
of the lawyer as mercenary, the other lionizing the lawyer, in Story's
famous phrase, as a public sentinel""9- both were written by authors
who staunchly defend a client-centered, ethically neutral conception
of the lawyer's role radically different from the morally activist
ideal. '"' And like other antebellum defenders of the adversary ethic,
both authors fall squarely within the "governing class" of republican
legal elites. Their role defenses also appear at the centerpoint of the
asserted hegemony of republican moral activism-a decade after the
publication of Hoffman's Resolutions and eight years before
Sharswood's Essay on Professional Ethics-and in the same medium
(magazine articles) other republican elites used to advance their
governing class ideology. To effectively pierce the myth of republican
moral activism, the contours of this robust debate on the definition
and justification of the lawyer's role must be explored without
assuming that republican ideology necessarily entails a morally activist
theory of lawyering.
109. See Joseph Story, Address Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, September
4, 1821, in The Legal Mind in America: From Independence to the Civil War, supra
note 65, at 63, 71; Joseph Story, Discourse Pronounced Upon the Inauguration of the
Author, as Dane Professor of Law in Harvard University, August 25, 1829, in The
Legal Mind in America: From Independence to the Civil War, supra note 65, at 176,
181 [hereinafter Story, Inauguration].
110. See Chandler, The Practice of the Bar, 9 Monthly L. Rep. 241, 242 (1846);
Jackson, Law and Lawyers: Is the Profession of the Advocate Consistent with Perfect
Integrity?, 28 Knickerbocker 49 (1846).
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A. Law Publishing: The Propaganda Project
The general consensus among historians is that, after the American
Revolution and in the face of a rapidly expanding, nascent legal
system, the legal profession was rather desperate for published legal
resources. "There were no American reports to speak of in the
colonial period," Lawrence Friedman writes, so lawyers were forced
"to rely on English reports, or on secondhand knowledge of English
cases, gleaned out of English treatises." '111 By the time the colonies
gained independence and established their own courts, exclusive
reliance on English sources became less fashionable, to say the least,
and lawyers began to "hunger" for American cases-indeed, for a
permanent, American system of common law.112 By the first decade
of the nineteenth century, lawyers and judges in a handful of states
had begun gathering and publishing legal opinions. Although they
became more formal and exclusively doctrinal when "appointed
officials replaced private entrepreneurs as law reporters," the early
reports "were far more than slavish accounts of the judges' words...
they were guidebooks for the practitioner. Some reporters added
little essays on the law to the oral and written courtroom materials
they collected."1 3
In addition to case reports, a market slowly emerged for a broader
"jurisprudential and practical literature. '114 This included newspaper
reports and commentary on trials, treatises and digests on specific
areas of law, and, much more gradually, periodicals, or "law
magazines" as they were called, which combined the genre of case
reporting with sporadic synthetic legal analysis and commentary on
hot topics.115 Bloomfield's study of antebellum law magazines shows
that while there were relatively few (no more than twenty at any point
in time and just twelve prior to 1830) and while most "failed to survive
more than a few years ... magazine publishing in general experienced
a boom during these years... [and] the rate of growth for such
specialized publications remains impressive." ' 6
An 1844 essay by Peleg Chandler, editor of the Monthly Law
Reporter, reflects both the anxiety and the promise of the nascent
medium." 7 It opens emphatically by celebrating the presence in the
United States of "seven journals, devoted to jurisprudence; seven
111. Friedman, supra note 8, at 323.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 324-25; see also Warren, supra note 24, at 325-40, 540-48; David D.
Caron, Introduction to Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law 6-7 (1991)
(describing Wheaton's approach as reporter for the Supreme Court from 181.6-1827).
114. Friedman, supra note 8, at 326.
115. Bloomfield, supra note 24, at 142; Friedman, supra note 8, at 326-29.
116. Bloomfield, supra note 24, at 142; see also Friedman, supra note 8, at 329
(noting that "[b]etter reporting put most of them out of business").
117. The journal started out as the "Law Reporter," but, for simplicity, I refer to it
throughout as the "Monthly Law Reporter."
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champions, we trust, of justice; seven burning candlesticks; not seven
sleepers. With the child of Wordsworth, we may say, 'We are
seven.""'" But before reviewing these journals, the essay pauses,
ominously, on the fate of ten failed efforts: "As we cast our eyes upon
the remains of so many journals that have gone before us, we feel
forcibly the brevity of existence that may be allotted to some of those
now rejoicing in new-born life." ' 9
Bloomfield contends, and other historians have agreed, that the
mission of those who controlled law publication in general, and law
magazines in particular, was not simply to meet a bourgeoning
demand for authoritative legal sources among practitioners, but also,
and perhaps more importantly, to advance a distinctly republican
ideology of law as the province of a virtuous elite. That is to say, the
literature of law, such as it was, reflected not merely materialistic or
functional impulses, but a basic propagandistic urge. The perceived
provocations to write, on this account, included longstanding public
hostility toward lawyers, criticism of their support for reception of
common law doctrines from England, and, especially as Jacksonian
leveling impulses surfaced in the 1820s and 1830s, the destruction of
barriers to the practice of law by laymen. 121' As Bloomfield asserts:
Like the case material, the remaining contents-reviews of new law
books, hints for the improvement of office habits or courtroom
strategy, summaries of recent state laws, and memoirs of
practitioners living and dead-appealed to a narrow professional
clientele. But behind a faqade of objectivity and noncommittal
exposition law writers busily pursued a further end: the creation of
an effective counterimage to the popular stereotype of the lawyer as
an enemy of the lower classes.1
2
'
But if this is so, it is all the more surprising to find within pages
dedicated to the republican professional agenda, outright ridicule and
rejection of the morally activist ideal of lawyering. Moreover, it
would appear that republican legal elites were always already in the
business of generating personally and publicly consoling myths about
professional identity. 22
118. American Law Journals, 7 Monthly L. Rep. 65 (1844).
119. Id. at 66.
120. I say "perceived," because, as Bloomfield has emphasized, and as we will see,
critics of the profession included distinguished members of the. bar, not just a
Jacksonian "sans-culotte radicalism." Bloomfield, supra note 24, at 138.
121. Id. at 143-44; see also id. at 142-43; Chroust, supra note 24, at 30 ("Highly
effective in the. gradual conquest of public opinion and the common mind was the
consistent and clever barrage of self-serving propaganda which the lawyers levied in
their own behalf." (citing The Legal Mind in America: From Independence to the Civil
War (Perry Miller ed., 1962))); White, supra note 14, at 105 (discussing coordination
between judges, treatise writers, reporters and legal educators).
122. See Bloomfield, supra note 24, at 144 ("[E]very great movement sooner or
later enters a mythmaking phase, in which earlier achievements... are reappraised
and idealized as guides for the future."). Although my survey of the periodicals
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B. Rereading the Role of the Republican Lawyer
To test the myth of civic republican moral activism, I have surveyed
the four most successful law magazines whose periods of publication
roughly overlap with the dates of publication of Hoffman's
Resolutions on Professional Development and Sharswood's Essay on
Professional Ethics.123 These are: the American Jurist (28 volumes
published in Boston from 1829-1843), the Monthly Law Reporter (27
volumes published in Boston from 1838-1866), the New York Legal
Observer (12 volumes published in New York from 1843-1854), and
the Western Law Journal (10 volumes published in Cincinnati from
1843-1853). For each journal I examined all articles discussing ethical
issues in the practice of law-this includes articles on the relationship
between law and morality, moral activism versus the adversary ethic,
the judicial process and the problem of legal indeterminacy
("uncertainty" was the term in vogue 124), codification, reprints of
lectures and public addresses on the legal profession and law reform,
editorial commentary on lawyers' conduct in famous cases (both
English and American), discussion of Lord Brougham's maxim, as
well as reviews and reprints of works on legal ethics (again, both
English and American).2 5 I have also surveyed topical articles,
addresses and materials from other legal and non-legal periodicals
between 1790 and 1860.126
Although some generalizations can be made-for instance, that the
Monthly Law Reporter begins strongly advocating the adversary ethic
corroborates Bloomfield's propaganda thesis to a certain extent, he does not discuss
the articles regarding professional ethics in making his broader claim that the image
of the legal professional promulgated in the magazines was of "a benevolently neutral
technocrat." Id. at 142. Even if Bloomfield is correct that elite lawyers were anxious
to disclaim political interest or ambition (what I take to be the core of his argument
on the normative image presented in the magazines), I am much more hesitant to
draw a synthetic conclusion of this kind with respect to the separate question of
lawyers' roles qua lawyers, and much more sympathetic with his critique of whiggish
historians who leaped too quickly to synthetic claims about the profession at the time.
See id. at 137 (criticizing Warren, Pound and Chroust for constructing a false
profession/populous dichotomy in examining the criticisms regarding antebellum law
and lawyers; "The 'degradation' of the nineteenth century lawyer accordingly
becomes a function of external pressures and interference rather than tensions within
the legal profession itself." (emphasis added)).
123. 1 have defined success by longevity-each of the reviewed journals was in
print for at least a decade.
124. See, e.g., Chief Justice Parker, A Charge to the Grand Jury Upon the
Uncertainty of the Law, and the Duties of those Concerned in the Administration of It
(1842).
125. Because eulogies for prominent lawyers and judges have been treated by both
Bloomfield and Hoeflich, I exclude them from consideration here.
126. Here I relied on cross-references from the law magazines and term searches in
the Nineteenth Century Masterfile, www.paratext.com, the American Periodical
Series Online, http://aps.umi.com, and Making of America,
http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa -all online, indexed databases focusing on early
American periodicals.
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in articles by the editor and then moves gradually to a more equivocal
position with changes in the editorship, 127 and that the Monthly Law
Reporter and the Western Law Journal more openly support the
adversary ethic than either the New York Legal Observer or the
American Jurist (both of which seem to lean toward moral activism or
indifference on the question)"'-the fairest statement is that the
editors avoided tendentious principles in their selection of and
commentary on legal ethics material.'29 One finds work supporting
127. Compare infra notes 131-55 and accompanying text (discussing essays in
Volume 5 by Peleg Chandler), with The Webster Case, 12 Monthly L. Rep. 1,9 (1850)
(editor Stephen H. Phillips commenting on Boston murder trial, and contending that
criticism of defense counsel for lackadaisical defense "is uncalled for, and unjust" and
"is most lamentable, for it would seem to throw upon the most high-minded advocate
the revolting task of contriving in every instance the wildest and most improper line
of defence"), Professional Conduct-The Courvoisier Case, 12 Monthly L. Rep. 433,
433-34 (1850) (editor Stephen, H. Philips describing and responding to conduct of
defense lawyer in famous English murder trial where the defense lawyer allegedly
attempted to implicate others and vouched for his client's innocence before the jury
after his client had confessed the crime), Mr. Charles Phillips's Defence of
Courvoisier, 12 Monthly L. Rep. 536 (1850) (republishing letters in response to editor
Philips's earlier commentary), Mr. Charles Phillips & the Courvoisier Case, 12
Monthly L. Rep. 553 (1850) (same), and Sharswood's A Compend of Lectures on the
Aims and Duties of the Profession of the Law, 17 Monthly L. Rep. 656 (1855) (book
review) (editors George P. Sanger and George S. Hale giving favorable review of
Sharswood; "we should be glad to see his work in the hands of every student at law,
indeed, of every lawyer").
128. Compare infra notes 131-55 and accompanying text (discussing essays by Peleg
Chandler, editor of the Monthly Law Reporter), and infra notes 184-211 and
accompanying text (discussing Timothy Walker, editor of the Western Law Journal),
with Proper Qualifications of an Attorney, 5 Am. Jurist 407, 407 (1831) (quoting
argument for "great moral probity" in British Solicitors from London Legal Observer,
January 1831), Simon Greenleaf, A Discourse Pronounced at the Inauguration of the
Author, as Royall Professor of Law, in Harvard University, August 26, 1834, 13 Am.
Jurist 107, 119 (1835) ("In the ardor of forensic conflict (the lawyer] is still to be
governed by the standard of morals in private life, and to personate no man but
himself."), James Kent, An Address Delivered Before the Law Association of the City
of New York, October 21, 1836, 16 Am. Jurist 471, 474 (1837) (positing that lawyer
educated in science of law will "when great interests are involved, and strong
prejudices excited, be able to vindicate the cause of right, and truth, and justice, with
powerful sympathies, and in strains of impassioned eloquence"), Points on Criminal
Law Evidence, 10 N.Y. Legal Observer 367, 368 (1852) (quoting Pitt Taylor's Law of
Evidence when arguing that exclusion of compelled confessions sacrifices justice and
common sense "on the shrine of mercy"), and The Legal Profession: Lawyers and
Lawyers' Fees in the "Old Dominion," 5 N.Y. Legal Observer 161 (1847) (offering
whiggish history of colonial regulation of lawyers in Virginia).
129. A more systematic investigation of the editors' biographies would have to be
conducted to say more on this point. The trouble with such an undertaking is that all
of the journals were, for at least some period, run by multiple editors and, with the
exception of the Western Law Journal, articles and commentary by the editors were
not identified by name. See American Law Journals, supra note 118, at 73 (noting that
anonymous publication was the standard practice "of periodical criticism in England
and America" and criticizing the Western Law Journal for deviating from the
tradition); cf Walker, Anonymous Writing- "I" v. "We," I W. L.J. 511-12 (1844)
(defending authorial attribution and use of first person singular rather than "'the
time-honored plural "We". . . employed ... by editors to cover their weakness"'
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moral activism and work defending the adversary ethic in each
journal, suggesting that, on the whole, and certainly over time, the
editors sought to publicize rather than strictly control debate on the
question of the lawyer's role.3 " What one does not find, in any
journal, is unequivocal support of morally activist lawyering either on
the terms Hoffman sets out in his Resolutions or on the bifurcated
scheme Sharswood sets out in his Essay.
1. "Mawkish Cant" and "Conscience Lawyers": Defending Client-
Centered Service and Ethical Neutrality
Because they have been ignored by role critics, the views of
nineteenth-century elites who vigorously promoted an adversary ethic
are worth exploring in some detail. Although there are significant
differences in style and emphasis, a common rhetorical structure is
apparent in their writings. Most begin by explaining that they write in
order to address or correct the popular misconception that lawyers are
dishonest, unscrupulous, bad men who willingly earn a living
advocating for clients and causes they know to be unjust. Thus Peleg
Chandler begins an 1842 essay entitled The Case of the Booms (a
criminal case in which the public, and the jury, mistakenly believed
the accused was guilty of murder) with the following introduction:
It is a common reproach against the profession, that advocates
undertake the defence of criminals whom they know to be guilty.
(quoting Peleg Chandler, author of American Law Journals, supra note 118, at 74)).
For the same reason-at least with respect to the essays examined from the Monthly
Law Reporter-anonymous publication makes it impossible to unqualifiedly attribute
authorship to its editor, Peleg Chandler. But his regular use of the "editorial We" for
the period in which he held sole editorial control of the magazine strongly supports
the attribution of authorship where I have made it. See also Anonymous Writing- "I"
v. "We," supra, at 512 (noting that Mr. Chandler has used "we" in his own editorial
commentary "in [the article criticizing the Western Law Journal], and every other
article written by him").
130. Client-centered material can be found in the pages of the American Jurist and
the New York Legal Observer. See Advocates and Clients, 1 N.Y. Legal Observer 112
(1842) (quoting Lord Brougham's maxim); Daniel Mayes, Whether Law is a Science,
An Introductory Lecture, Delivered to the Law Class of Transylvania University,
November 8, 1832, 9 Am. Jurist 349, 359 (1833) (defending special pleadings); Basil
Montagu, The Barrister, 26 Am. Jurist 366 (1842) (quoting extensively from essay
offering client-centered conception of his role as an English Barrister). And material
supporting moral activism can be found in the pages of the Monthly Law Reporter
and the Western Law Journal. See Law and Lawyers, 2 W. L.J. 135 (1844) (excerpting
David Dudley Field's essay The Study and Practice of Law "because it presents a very
strong view of the moral obligations of the profession. My own opinions, have been
heretofore expressed in this Journal."); The Profession, 5 W. L.J. 284, 285 (1848)
(quoting advocate of "union and purity" in the profession); Study of the Law: John C.
Calhoun's Letter, 7 W. L.J. 534, 535 (1850) (reprinting letter from John C. Calhoun to
student at Ballston Law School, January 20, 1850; "In the defense of one whom you
believe to be guilty, proceed no further than is necessary to elicit the truth by an even
balance of testimony. It is a fearful thing to encourage crime, even though it may be
in the way of professional defense.").
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An unsuccessful defence is viewed as conclusive evidence that it
should not have been undertaken; and a successful one, as an
unwarrantable prostitution of talents to a bad cause; as a wrong
done to society under the sanction of law.... The successful
advocate is sometimes regarded as a bad citizen, whose energies
have been directed to breaking the bars of a tiger's cage, and causing
the remorseless savage a little longer to pursue its depredations. In
any event, the profession are often stigmatized as the
"indiscriminate defenders of right and wrong by the indiscriminate
utterance of truth or falsehood."1 31
Chandler is far less diplomatic in an essay published a year later called
Legal Morality, in which he responded to criticisms of the bar in a
religious newspaper:
There has been a great deal of mawkish cant about the practice of
the law; and some moralists have been indulgent enough to
volunteer apologies for the necessary obliquity of a lawyer's
conscience; while others, less lax in their views of moral duties, have
consigned the whole profession and its practice to unqualified
condemnation.
The impression, which an uninformed mind would derive from
either of these classes of writers, would be, that chicanery and
deception were assentially [sic] incident to the practice of law; and
the only question that could arise in regard to it, would be how a
man who made any pretention to honesty, could reconcile it to his
conscience to be a lawyer at all. Indeed, a notion something like this
has long prevailed ... [and] it is... supposed to rest upon certain
admitted facts ... among them, the most prominent, perhaps, is, that
not only is a lawyer willing to engage in a bad cause, but let a
criminal be ever so guilty, he is almost always able to find
professional aid in his defence.1 32
As Chandler's proems suggest, role defenders also tended to frame
their responses to popular misconceptions by isolating and working
from what they took to be the strongest charge against the
profession-that lawyers knowingly defend guilty criminals, or,
alternatively, defend the accused without being satisfied or even
caring about their guilt or innocence. 133 This is not to say, however,
that the lawyer's duty in civil cases was disregarded or rigidly
distinguished. 34 Instead, role defenders used the criminal paradigm
131. The Case of the Booms, 5 Monthly L. Rep. 193 (1842).
132. Legal Morality, 5 Monthly L. Rep. 529 (1843); see also Chandler, supra note
110; Jackson, supra note 110; The Morals and Utility of Lawyers, 7 W. L.J. 1, 10
(1849).
133. See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 110, at 248 (arguing that a clearly guilty
defendant still has the right to have a lawyer put the prosecution to its proof); The
Case of the Booms, supra note 131, at 194 (same); Jackson, supra note 110, at 382
(same).
134. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 132, at 379 (discussing contracts, commercial law,
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both to establish the strength of their convictions in a context that
implied in theory, if not in fact, the most dire consequences for
society, and, as with contemporary arguments for the adversary ethic,
in order to construct a compelling paradigm of zealous advocacy.135
On the merits of the adversary ethic, role defenders typically
insisted that (1) serving the client serves rule of law values, (2)
contrary to Hoffman, most cases are actually doubtful cases on
questions of morality and justice, (3) the lawyer has a duty to serve
regardless of what he thinks about the morality or justice of the
client's ends, (4) a morally activist conception of the role would
permit the lawyer to usurp the function of judge and jury, and (5)
whatever they support in the role, chicanery and deliberate falsehood
are categorically indefensible. Chandler's essay, Legal Morality, and
James Jackson's essay, Law and Lawyers: Is the Profession of the
Advocate Consistent with Perfect Integrity?, are emblematic.
a. Peleg Chandler
Born in 1816 at New Gloucester, Maine to a blue blooded family,
Peleg Whitman Chandler graduated from Bowdoin College and after
a short stint apprenticing in his father's law office in Bangor, entered
what was then known as the Dane Law School at Harvard.36 He
began work in legal publishing early, reporting cases for the Boston
Daily Advertiser while still at Harvard, and in the year after being
admitted to the Suffolk County Bar, established the Monthly Law
Reporter. 37 Strong republican propagandist themes can be seen in his
letter to Joseph Story detailing the reasons for launching the
magazine:
It seems to me that the spirit of innovation is, in many respects,
tearing away, in our profession, many of the most ancient and
approved landmarks. There is a vast deal of theory-an immense
longing for El Dorados in the law. A great deal is said in particular
cases, even in arguments in court, about what the law ought to be or
might well be, but precious little of what it is. Now it would seem
that a good way to check this thing, as well as the political revolution
founded in the same spirit, is to hold up before the profession and
the public the decisions fresh from the court-to place before them
the law as it comes from the dispensers of it-from those who are
too far removed from the public to be easily affected by the
and trusts and estates along with criminal law); Legal Morality, supra note 132, at 531
(defending use of statute of limitations); The Morals and Utility of Lawyers, supra
note 132, at 11-12.
135. For one of the few strong, contemporary role defenses, see Monroe H.
Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (1975).
136. He also read law under Theophilus Parsons, a relative.
137. See 3 Dictionary of American Biography 615 (1929); see also 1 The Green Bag
270 (1889) (Chandler's obituary).
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changing fashions of the day... . Noisy radicals are not men who
have read intimately the reports and become acquainted with the
intricate machinery, of which, if a part be disarranged, the whole
may suffer.. . . In conducting the L.R., I have been actuated by
these feelings, and have striven to make it a matter of fact affair. 38
Yet on the question of professional ethics, Chandler was a staunch
opponent of moral activism in the role. Against the "mawkish cant"
of those moralists who denounced lawyers for taking unjust cases,
Chandler stressed the rule of law values served by adversary
proceedings in his essay Legal Morality:
Now let us suppose all this to be true, what does it amount to in
supporting the charge? Is it not simply this: A lawsuit is a
controversy between two parties, where each seeks to avail himself
of the aid of some one, more experienced than himself, to establish
the fact that he is in the right, or not so much in the wrong as the
other party alleges; and here is a class of men who by study and
devotion to business, have qualified themselves to represent these
litigant parties before tribunals established for the very purpose of
determining such controversies.1 39
Chandler then queries rhetorically: "May they, then, without violating
their consciences, lend their aid to parties thus situated? Or must the
lawyer... first settle in his own mind, beyond the possibility of
mistake, precisely where the truth and equity of the cause lies?"''
Even if the lawyer should refuse in one out of a thousand cases
where the cause is clearly against the interests of justice, "what shall
he do in the nine hundred ninety-nine cases of a doubtful character
where... 'a great deal may be said on both sides?"""' And "[w]ho in
this is deceived or injured" if the lawyer holds himself "bound as an
honest man, fairly and fully to present to the court or jury, whatever
there is of truth or justice in his client's cause, so as to produce its full
effect, even though in finally balancing its merits, the scale is found to
preponderate against him?"' 42
Turning from question to answer, Chandler says he believes "not
only that a lawyer may honorably and honestly engage in a cause of
doubtful justice," but that, far from filtering law and fact based on his
opinion of the merits or justice of his client's case, "he is bound fairly
and fully to present to the court and jury whatever of law or fact there
may be favorable to his client, leaving to the counsel upon the other
138. Quoted in Bloomfield, supra note 24, at 143; see also Preface, 1 Monthly L.
Rep. iii-iv (1838); The Law Reporter, I Monthly L. Rep. 55 (1838).
139. Legal Morality, supra note 132, at 529-30.
140. Id. at 530.
141. Id.; see also The Bench and Bar, 5 Monthly L. Rep. 1, 7 (1842) (arguing against
judicial pre-judgment that "[i]n most cases, it is the erroneous view, which is the most
obvious,-the correct one is to be dug out and brought to light. It is truth which
resides in a well, and it is error which generally covers that well.").
142. Legal Morality, supra note 132, at 530.
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side to do the same thing for his client." 4 He goes on to link this
view to the impartial administration of justice: "In this way the whole
cause is brought fairly before the tribunal which is to decide it. It is in
fact, the only way in which justice can ordinarily be reached, and while
trials are thus managed, not only will justice in most instances be
attained, but what is scarcely less important, so far as others than the
parties are concerned, it will be done as to satisfy the public mind, that
this justice has been fairly reached." '44 We can see all the familiar
contours of what David Luban (referring to the modern prevalence of
amoral advocacy) has called "the adversary system excuse"-the
claim that the lawyer's client-centered role is foreordained by the
requirements of the adversary process.145
Chandler goes even further though, arguing not just that adversary
presentation of proof leads to a full consideration of the merits, but
that it serves the interests of law and justice for the lawyer to plead
technical defenses like the statute of limitations:
[I]t is said lawyers are guilty of taking advantage, in behalf of their
clients, of technical rules of law, and one of the graver charges
adduced in one of the articles already alluded to, was that the statute
of limitations has been at times made use of to defeat an honest
debt. All this may sound very well, and might be very good logic as
well as good ethics, if the lawyer made use of these legal bars in his
own case. But if legislators make laws which are intended for
general application, what right has a lawyer to set up his own
scruples of conscience by denying to a citizen the protection of one
of these laws?...
Rules of law, designed to advance the greatest good of a whole
community, may sometimes work individual injustice, and if the
right of any citizen to avail himself of what the law has provided is to
depend upon the moral sense of his legal adviser, law would lose its
very definition as a prescribed rule of action, and vary, not according
to the length of the chancellor's foot, but the stretch of a lawyer's
conscience. 6
Thus, Chandler not only rejects Hoffman's resolutions regarding
technical pleas, but his entire account of the lawyer as judge. Moral
activism by lawyers would lead to lawlessness and suppression of
individual rights-a despotism of attorneys. The lawyer's expertise,
Chandler insists, should be dedicated to achieving the client's ends,
not to prejudging the client's case and usurping thereby the function
of judge and jury.
143. Id.
144. Id. Playing the point out, Chandler argues that the public would come to
doubt the validity of hasty convictions based on popular opinion. Id. at 530-31.
145. The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 7, at 113.
146. Legal Morality, supra note 132, at 531-32.
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Chandler concludes the essay by distinguishing sharp practice and
chicanery on the one hand, from the zeal produced by lawyers
virtuously engaged in defending unpopular clients and attacking
government corruption. "Let no one suppose we would apologize for,
or defend quibbles or chicane in the practice of law. The very
premises upon which we rest our remark is, that neither trick nor
falsehood are any more necessarily connected with the profession of
law than that of medicine or theology. 1' 47  Echoing the republican
commitment to law as a science requiring long study, Chandler implies
that lower standards for admission to practice are at least partly to
blame for chicanery and deception.'48
But apart from trickery and "intentionally misrepresent[ing]
evidence to a jury, or legal principles to a court," Chandler argues that
lawyers are entitled, and often obliged to "take great license of
speech.., to attain anything like justice."'49 Eloquence, the art of the
orator, is often necessary, he said, "to contend with popular
prejudices, and unfriendly, not to say false, witnesses, as well as
powerful and interested combinations.... It is at such times that the
moral courage of a good lawyer is brought to bear upon those who
would prostrate his client."' 5"
Chandler's view of "the necessity of an independent bar to the
cause of human rights" thus directly counters Hoffman's view of
professional independence.' Instead of independence from client (in
order to serve public justice), Chandler advocates independence from
state and popular opinion (because public justice is impossible without
strong client-centered advocacy). Both conceptions meet the civic
republican definition of virtue as self-restraint and sacrifice for the
public good, and both conceptions reflect republican conceptions of
law as a science of principles administered by an elite corps of public
sentinels.5 2
Chandler also worked outside journalism to live up to the lawyer-
statesman ideal: he was a prominent civil trial lawyer ("the best jury
147. Id. at 532.
148. He writes that "since the legislature in their wisdom have thrown open the bar
to all, and taken away from its members all restraints or control over one another, this
evil may have been increasing." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (emphasis omitted).
152. Chandler blasts the "senseless homily about the doubtful propriety of a
religious or a good man, pursuing the profession of the law," insisting that the honor
and trustworthihess of the profession is proved by the fact that individual members of
the community so often repose their trust in lawyers. Id. at 532-33. "Whatever idle
tongues or more idle pens may say of the morality of the legal profession as a pursuit,
the relation which lawyers hold to the community belies such general and undefined
charges." Id. at 533. For a contemporary statement with strong parallels to Chandler,
see Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
Wisc. L. Rev. 1529.
1434 [Vol. 71
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL ETHICS
lawyer in Massachusetts with the possible exception of Choate"); he
twice served in the State House of Representatives and held positions
on the Boston Common Council; he also accepted an appointment as
United States bankruptcy commissioner; and he published with some
regularity outside the Monthly Law Reporter.5 3 So he can hardly be
branded a "rank and file" lawyer and dismissed for want of civic
republican credentials.154 Nor was Legal Morality his only defense of
the adversary ethic.155
b. James Jackson
Son of the governor of Georgia, James Jackson was born in 1819,
attended the University of Georgia in Athens and read law under
Howell Cobb. A "cultivated classical scholar" and "a pious
Methodist," he was admitted to practice in 1839 and rather quickly
entered a life of public service. 56 He was a Representative in the
Georgia General Assembly from 1845-1849, took the bench for the
superior courts of the western circuit of the state, and then served in
Congress until the Civil War broke out when he became a judge-
advocate on Stonewall Jackson's staff. Following the war he
reentered practice, running a law office with a series of partners until
his appointment to the Georgia Supreme Court in 1875. He served as
Chief Justice of the Court from 1880 until his death seven years
later.157
Writing to rebut the charge that "[a] successful lawyer is a sort of
licensed knave, refined perhaps in his mode of cheating, but really
little better than a prime minister of Satan," Jackson begins his 1846
essay, Law and Lawyers, by observing that the expense and delay of
litigation, along with popular envy against "[e]xcellence of any kind"
can account for much of the "obloquy cast upon the legal
profession.' 58 But expense, he insists, is a relative concept ("men are
prone by nature to consider the possession of their property as an
indisputable right, and to regard whatever is spent in defending it as
lost"), and delay, although a "serious evil," is the fault of the
legislature, "or whoever constitute the courts of a state, for not
establishing a reasonable number of judicial tribunals; or it is more
153. See 3 Dictionary of American Biography, supra note 137, at 615.
154. See supra note 45.
155. See The Bench and the Bar, supra note 141; The Case of the Booms, supra note
131; Chandler, supra note 110; Trial of Courvoisier-License of Counsel, 3 Monthly L.
Rep. 194 (1840).
156. The Legal Mind in America, From Independence to the Civil War, supra note
65, at 275 (describing James Jackson in editor's introduction to his Law and Lawyers
of 1846).
157. 9 Dictionary of American Biography, supra note 137, at 547.
158. Jackson, supra note 110.
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frequently attributable to the trickery of the other party litigant."'59
In any event, Jackson concludes, "[t]he advocate is the last person to
be held responsible for this great stain upon our legal system."'161 And
envy of professional elites he denounces as a "pernicious" sentiment,
since the false accusations it produces among the ignorant "rabble"
risks severing the "golden chain" of public confidence and esteem
which binds men to virtue.1
6
'
But while dismissing "the cynicism of the modern rabble" Jackson
concedes that "the advocate is perhaps exposed to greater temptations
to wicked practices than any other person in society.' 1 62 Practicing "a
science so intricate and mysterious" gives lawyers power to pervert
law "and in the name of Justice itself to thwart justice," or to take
advantage of their relation of confidence with clients "to defraud
[them] without detection, or even suspicion." 163 Still, Jackson adds, all
"the other liberal professions" are subject to similar temptation
because they enjoy similar privileges.'64 "But that there is any thing in
the science or the practice of law which necessarily involves a stifling
of conscience, the sacrifice of one iota of principle, a support of
injustice or inevitable dishonesty, we do most firmly and solemnly
deny. 9 165
Jackson then breaks his defense of the integrity of the profession
into four segments corresponding to what he takes to be the "chief
objections... [and] calumnies thrown out against the
advocate .... "66 The first charge "triumphantly asserted by some
wiseacres of the present day" is that advocates are guilty of dishonesty
at least half the time by "enlist[ing] in a cause without knowing or
even caring which side is in the wrong" when it is impossible that both
sides are right.1 67 Jackson's reply, like Chandler's, is that in most
cases, the truth of the matter is either unknowable or requires a full
presentation of proof to decide:
[I]t is only necessary to bear in mind that all matters of opinion are
not capable of perfect mathematical demonstration; that they are
not so obvious as to make it necessary that either party should
prosecute his claim at the expense of integrity; that the affairs of
mankind are not so nicely adjusted as that one party in a law-suit
should be entirely right and the other entirely wrong; and that truth
cannot be elicited and justice awarded unless both sides of a case are
fairly represented. Consider the intricacies of contracts and
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 378.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 379.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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commercial relations; the difficulty in many cases of ascertaining the
true meaning of the will of testators; and above all, the nice
distinctions to be made in determining the degree of criminality.
168
Even if a lawyer wanted to, factual and legal indeterminacy render it
"palpably absurd for the advocate to prejudge the questions to which
these and a thousand other subjects, equally complicated, give rise." '169
And, perhaps more importantly for Jackson, the desire to prejudge is
misplaced: "it is not for the advocate to say whether a cause is just or
unjust; for him to decide upon the justice or injustice of a case would
be to usurp the province of the judge. Many cases which at first
seemed to be bad have on examination proved to be good."'7 °
Instead, "the advocate is bound to represent his side of the case, right
or wrong, in the best possible light, and to enforce the strongest
arguments he can devise in favor of his client, leaving the validity of
those arguments and the true merits of the case to the decision of the
judge, whose business alone it is to decide."'71 Any other course,
Jackson warns, would "introduce mob-law, and make every man his
own judge and his own avenger."' 72 Thus, as with Chandler, Jackson
links epistemological uncertainty to the adversary system and the
adversary system to the maintenance of rule according to law. The
lawyer's duty of zealous client service and ethical neutrality follows as
a consequence of these premises.
The second charge Jackson addresses is that the lawyer defends
"depraved criminal[s]"-people "whom he knows to be morally
guilty." '  Jackson acknowledges the social interests behind the
"demand that justice should be done to [the criminal] as well as to the
offended law and the outraged community."'74 But against this, he
argues, two familiar principles of justice also must be weighed-"that
every man shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty," and "that
punishment shall be apportioned to crime."'75 Thus, "[n]o matter how
certain the community may be of the criminal's guilt, it would be a
palpable subversion of law to allow this fact to detract one iota from
his privilege of defence. Without this faithful scrupulousness of the
law it would lose its authority and we its protection."'76 The same
right to defend exists with respect to the degree of culpability, Jackson
adds, even where there is uncontroverted evidence of guilt, and the
criminally accused invariably require "the learning and ingenuity of
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id.; see also id. ("Probably in the majority of cases which turn out unfavorably
to the advocate, he really believes himself to be in the right.").
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 380.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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counsel" to ensure adherence to law rather than prejudice. Indeed,
client service in this setting, for Jackson, is as just a professional goal
as vindicating the claims of the innocent and oppressed:
Here then, on the inimitable principles of justice, do we take our
stand, and maintain that every case, however bad, every criminal,
however depraved, has a claim upon the services of the advocate,
and that the advocate may honestly defend a person whom he
knows to be guilty of some crime; and we hold that in attempting to
avert from his client a penalty disproportioned to his offence, he is
discharging a duty as truly just and noble as if he were holding the
shield of his eloquence over the most pure and innocent.177
At least in criminal matters, then, the right to counsel and the
adversary ethic distinguish "the humanity of modern law" from "the
barbarism of former ages."
178
Quite apart from litigating the degree of culpability, Jackson
continues, lawyers are charged with endeavoring to prove innocent
clients they know to be guilty, especially by raising technical defenses.
Here Jackson distinguishes law from morality while preserving law's
relationship to justice and to what Hoffman called "the substantial
interests of the community." He argues that "technical rules" have
been adopted in order to protect the innocent, that "every science has
its forms," and that "it is only through the technicalities of the law that
its spirit can be imparted and the understanding reached. 179 So when
a lawyer successfully moves to dismiss an indictment due to a
technical flaw, "it is not the advocate who clears the criminal. He only
performs his duty to his client, leaving the result of his arguments to
the judge and jury. Why not throw the blame, if blame there be, upon
them? Every avenue of escape for the prisoner should be kept
open.' 8 1' By vindicating the rights of the accused, Jackson asserts in a
formulation well-worn in contemporary discourse, the liberty of all is
protected. Thus, short of "bribery or trickery, or any other sort of
meanness," the advocate "may honestly and conscientiously.., labor
with all his might to show that the evidence adduced in a given case
does not justify a conviction." ''
The final charge Jackson responds to is that the lawyer's strict
adherence to the attorney-client privilege often "cheats the law out of
its proper victim."'82 Here, Jackson takes a completely client-centered
turn, equating the lawyer with the client in order to equate any
177. Id. at 380-81.
178. Id. at 381.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 382. Like Chandler, Jackson complains that "the law itself is defied and
mocked by its own ministers," but he insists that these "usurers and gamblers and
sharks and thieves" cannot be used to stigmatize the "whole class ... as rogues. ..
Id.
182. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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obligation to divulge client secrets with compelled self-
incrimination. 183
The essay closes with strong republican bromides on the dignity and
moral rectitude of law and lawyering (and with the invocation of
Story's "public sentinel" metaphor quoted at the beginning of this
section). That Jackson and Chandler come from such different
backgrounds (one is a southerner, a product of the apprentice system
and spent more time in public service than law practice, the other is
New England gentry, a disciple of the new vision of university law
schools, and a renowned trial lawyer) but arrive at such similar
conclusions about the ethics of lawyering, suggests the norm of client-
centered, ethically neutral advocacy was not an isolated or parochial
phenomenon.
Unlike the work of Hoffman and Sharswood, Jackson and
Chandler's articles were not addressed to law students, but rather to
the profession as a whole. Whether this influenced the strength of
their views is difficult to say. However, Timothy Walker, the editor of
the Western Law Journal, gives us a glimpse of a republican
propagandist who (like Hoffman and Sharswood) reproduced
addresses to law students for consumption by a general law audience.
c. Timothy Walker: A Middle Position?
Once established in Boston, Chandler never strayed far. Timothy
Walker, by contrast, was a native of Massachusetts who, despite deep
roots (his family came over on the Mayflower) left for the west after
completing a year of study under Joseph Story at the Harvard Law
School. (Notwithstanding Walker's support of codification, a break
from conservative republican doctrine, Perry Miller characterizes him
as "the first who carried the message directly from the lips of the
master."'") He arrived in Cincinnati at the age of twenty-seven in
1830 and apprenticed with a local firm for a year before being
admitted to practice.
With a former Ohio Supreme Court Judge, Walker founded in 1833
what later became the Law School of Cincinnati-a private school
affiliated with Cincinnati College. And in 1842, a year before he
launched the Western Law Journal, he took the bench as judge of the
court of common pleas in Hamilton County. Walker is best
remembered, though, for his Introduction to American Law (1837)-a
183. Id. ("[I]t must be remembered that the advocate stands in the very place of the
accused; that he becomes acquainted with what he would not know upon any other
condition. And we would ask upon what principles of reason or justice can a man be
made to testify against himself; or by what right can the advocate, standing in the
place of the accused, be compelled to do the same?")
184. The Legal Mind in America, From Independence to the Civil War, supra note
65, at 239.
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compilation of lectures he gave in the law school that went through
eleven editions, the last published in 1905."5
His ambitions for the Western Law Journal were "to gather from,
and diffuse among the Lawyers of the West, whatever is most worthy
of note in their profession. To this end, they are, one and all, invited
and urged to furnish Reports of interesting Cases, Notices of new Law
Books, and Biographical Sketches of deceased members of the
profession."'8 6 It appears, however, that Walker was the main
provider for most of the life of the journal. He "performed nearly all
the editorial labor" until another editor, M.E. Curwen, came on to
assist in the final three years of the journal's ten year run." 7 When the
journal finally closed, it was due not merely to the inadequacy of
subscriptions (the journal rarely brought in more than the costs of
publishing), but to the desultory response of the western bench and
bar to his invitation to "furnish matter" for the journal's pages. 8
The Western Law Journal contains at least three works reprinted
from Walker's efforts in law teaching. His essay, Ways and Means of
Professional Success, taken from a valedictory address to the
graduates of the Law Class of the Cincinnati College on March 2,
1839, is exemplary." 9 Thematically, Walker mounts a defense of
client-centered, ethically neutral advocacy that is both more subtle
and less strident than those of Jackson and Chandler. The address
also reflects a fascinating concatenation of republican values (law as a
scientific discipline requiring virtuous, hard working experts) and
progressive positions (the dire need for law reform and criticism of
lawyers' self-interested opposition to it). Walker's normative
conception of the role thus frames the lawyer as a public sentinel, but
on terms that place him between Sharswood, on the one hand, and
Jackson and Chandler on the other.
Walker suggests three "principle requisites for professional success"
to his students: a "competent knowledge of the law, strict attention to
business, and inflexible integrity.""'" Professional success, he
185. 19 Dictionary of American Biography, supra note 137, at 363; The Legal Mind
in America: From Independence to the Civil War, supra note 65, at 238-40.
186. Prospectus of the Western Law Journal, 1 W. L.J. 1 (1843).
187. Editor's Letter, 10 W. L.J. 430 (1853).
188. See id.; The Western Law Journal: Shall it Be Continued?, 10 W. L.J. 522
(1853).
189. T. Walker, Ways and Means of Professional Success, 1 W. L.J. 542 (1844)
[hereinafter Ways and Means of Professional Success]. The other two are: T. Walker,
Advice to Law Students: being the substance of a valedictory address to the graduates of
the Law Class, in the Cincinnati College, delivered March 3, 1838, 1 W. L.J. 481 (1844)
[hereinafter Advice to Law Students]; and excerpts from the Introduction to
American Law interlineated in rebuttal form to The Morals and Utilities of Lawyers, a
lecture by one John T. Brooke, D.D., Rector of the Church of Christ, Cincinnati,
before the Philomathesian Society of Kenyon College, supra note 132; see also The
Legal Mind in America: From Independence to the Civil War, supra note 65, at 240.
190. Ways and Means of Professional Success, supra note 189, at 548.
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admonishes, is not defined in financial terms,19 but rather in the
reputational rewards incident to "high eminence at the bar.' 9 2
Money is significant only insofar as it helps ensure a lawyer's security
and "independence.' 9 3  Moving to the first principle of success,
Walker argues that competence is only to be "acquired by vast labor.
Our profession," he continues, "allows no borrowed capital. We must
ourselves create the stock we trade upon; not by hand-work, but by
head-work; long continued, unremitted head-work.... [Y]ou could
not have selected a profession requiring more laborious research.1 94
Even so, Walker insists, knowledge of the law is insufficient by itself
to guarantee success. The lawyer must also be devoted to his clients.
"The most learned lawyer in the world would not get business, if he
did not attend to it. The question with the client is, not who knows
the most law, but who will manage a cause best; and, all other things
being equal, he will manage a cause the best, who devotes the
attention to it."'95 A good lawyer "should be able to anticipate and
meet every question of fact and law which can possibly arise in the
progress of a trial. Otherwise he will find himself drifting in the dark
without rudder or compass. 196 Here Walker nods to the republican
project of separating lawyers from political ambition, adding that
effective, client-centered service demands that lawyers "must be
nothing but lawyers.... [L]aw must be your exclusive pursuit."'97 She
is "a jealous mistress," and "professional and political success rarely
go together."'9 8
Knowledge of the law and dedication to one's clients must be
supplemented With unflagging integrity. "I know of no profession,"
Walker argues, "in which success depends so much upon public
confidence; and nothing but the strictest integrity can secure this
confidence." '99  Here Walker makes his strongest endorsement of
moral activism, asserting that at least in the context of client
counseling (an aspect of the role ignored by Chandler and Jackson)
the lawyer's "opinions should not only be learnedly, but honestly
given.... Such a course will gain ten clients where it loses one, and
thus virtue will be literally its own reward. '21°0
191. Id. at 542 ("[W]e should hardly call him a successful lawyer, who merely
drudged for his daily bread.").
192. Id. at 543.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 544.
195. Id. at 545.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 545-46; see also id. at 546 ("I would rather stand well even in a county
Court, than be at the very head of stump politicians. And had I the most burning
thirst for fame, and the power to choose what kind it should be, I would be a
Mansfield rather than a Pitt, a Marshall rather than a Jefferson.").
199. Id. at 546.
200. Id.; see also id. at 547 ("Make it an invariable rule, therefore, never to advise a
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Walker then moves to the question of litigating for an unjust cause.
He dismisses public criticism on this point as "a libel upon us,"201 but
his position is mixed, both anticipating the epistemological caution of
Sharswood and retreating a bit from the normative conclusions of
Chandler and Jackson:
When a client has a bad cause, shall we prosecute it for him? This is
a question which each of you must make up his mind upon, for it will
often arise. After much reflection, I have arrived at the conclusion,
that a lawyer is not accountable for the moral character of the cause
he prosecutes, but only for the manner in which he conducts it. If he
does no more than present the case to the Court and jury in the most
favorable light, without falsehood, deception or misrepresentation, it
seems to me that he only discharges his duty to himself, his client,
and the community, and co-operates in promoting the great ends of
justice. °2
Moral activism regarding a client's ends, on the other hand, "would
make lawyers their clients' conscience-keepers, and require them to
prejudge a cause by declining to undertake it. The result would be,
that a questionable case would find no advocates... and thus a cause
is decided before it goes into Court. This reasoning may be fallacious,
but it has satisfied my own mind. 2 3
With Walker then, we see a more rigid distinction between the
lawyer's moral accountability for the ends served and the means
used. 21  All three role defenders repudiate chicane and what Walker
calls "the rascally maxim, that every thing is fair in litigation,'22 5 but,
Walker appears more categorical. As he elsewhere emphasizes:
"[Clients] have purchased your services, but not your consciences.
You are not responsible for the goodness of their cause; but you are
responsible for the means you use to gain it. '2°6
man contrary to your own convictions.").
201. Id. at 546.
202. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
203. Id. Even where the lawyer has advised the client that he stands on the wrong
side of the case, Walker remains client-centered. As he argues in another essay,
where the lawyer believes the law to be against his client, he "need not hesitate to act
for him" if the client insists on pursuing the matter since "we are not infallible, and
peradventure the law may turn out to be the other way; or he may have justice on his
side, though the law may seem against him; and in either case, he ought not to be cut off
from the chances of litigation." The Morals and Utility of Lawyers, supra note 132, at
11 (emphasis added). Where the law is with the client, but the lawyer believes
"abstract justice" is not, "no principle of moral obligation prohibits me from
prosecuting his cause ... I am not an infallible judge of right and wrong... I
undertake only to assert his legal rights; and if, in doing so, I make use of no chicanery
or deception, I come out of the cause with clean hands. The question of abstract
justice is with him, and not with me; and I am as much justified in conducting his cause,
as the judge is in deciding it for him." Id. at 1,1-12 (emphasis added).
204. The distinction has held. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2 (2002).
205. Ways and Means of Professional Success, supra note 189, at 547.
206. Advice to Law Students, supra note 189, at 483.
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Walker also rejects the notion (embraced by other role defenders)
that flaws in the law can be used by lawyers to deflect public scorn.
On Walker's account, lawyers make law and are therefore responsible
for remedying its defects.27 Despite the "improving spirit" felt "in
every other science," he says, the lawyer has heretofore resisted law
reform because
[s]elf-interest... prompts him to resist innovation. He feels as if he
had a vested right in the very abuses of the law. He has no idea of
encouraging that reform, which would place the mere stripling on a
level with himself. And when you ask him to change the law, since
he alone knows how to do it, he smiles at your simplicity. Will he
help to legislate bread out of his mouth? This is asking a little too
much. He is willing to help in reforming any thing else, but prefers
that the law should remain as it is.
208
Walker thus brilliantly turns the metaphor of legal science-used by
conservatives like Story to defend the common law2 09-into an
argument for law reform generally, and codification in particular. He
simultaneously adds to his basically client-centered conception of the
role a moral obligation to engage in law reform-a move echoed in
David Dudley Field's early writings210 and imported into what Robert
Gordon has called the "schizoid" concept of lawyering when the bar
turned away from civic republican ideals.21
2. The Discourse of Moral Exhortation
Walker, Jackson, and Chandler all offer robust defenses of client-
centered, ethically neutral lawyering from within the conceptual
framework of civic republicanism. 212 Others can be added to the list.
For instance, Samuel D. Parker, a Commonwealth's Attorney for
Suffolk County in the 1830s, is reported to have offered in trial a role
207. Ways and Means of Professional Success, supra note 189, at 548 ("The law,
considered as a science, is far from being perfect.... But I would go further, and say,
that at this moment, the law is far in the rear of all the other sciences. If you ask who
are to blame for this, I answer, the lawyers themselves. They have ever been, and
ever must be the chief law makers; and for this plain reason, that they alone can know
the wants to be supplied.").
208. Id.
209. See The Legal Mind in America, From Independence to the Civil War, supra
note 65, at 184-85.
210. See I Speeches, Arguments, and Miscellaneous Papers of David Dudley Field,
supra note 36.
211. Gordon, New York City Lawyers, supra note 10, at 65; Gordon, Independence
of Lawyers, supra note 10, at 22; Gordon, Legal Thought supra note 10, at 99.
212. Cf Charles P James, Lawyers and Their Traits, An Address Delivered Before
the Law School of the Cincinnati College, September 12, 1851, 9 W. L.J. 49 (offering
the only thoroughgoing Jacksonian account of the profession outside the discourse of
republicanism I found; contending that open access to law practice will reform
lawyers by bringing the standards of common morality into the profession).
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defense nearly as strong as Lord Brougham's.213 But the work of
Chandler, Jackson, and Walker is sufficient to undercut the core of
the declension thesis-that serious, sustained defenses of the
adversary ethic do not emerge until lawyers professionalize and
become wedded to the rise of corporate capitalism in the late
nineteenth century.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the magazine literature
does not unequivocally support client-centered service and ethical
neutrality. There is a literature that at least roughly tracks Hoffman's
and Sharswood's civic republican exhortation to moral activism. A
detailed review of this literature is unnecessary to support the thesis of
this article," 4 but a few synthetic comments are in order.
Those who supported a morally activist ideal were, on balance, (a)
more emphatic that deception and sharp practice bringing the
profession into disrepute were caused by ignorance and knavery
among lawyers who either entered the profession under newly
reduced standards for admission or trained in the presumptively
defective apprentice system,215 (b) more likely to oppose law reform,
especially codification,216 and (c) less likely to express epistemological
doubts about lawyers' ability to determine the justice of their clients'
ends." 7 At the same time, on the specific question of a lawyer's
right/duty to represent an unjust cause, no one offered a theory of
213. Parker is quoted as arguing:
It is the duty of a counsel not to be a witness against his client, either by
work or act. Even if his client should tell him that he is guilty, he is bound
not to take it to be so; for his client, through ignorance of the law, or the
nature of the evidence requisite to warrant a conviction, may suppose
himself guilty, under the law, when in fact he is not, although he may have
committed some great moral wrong. Even if the counsel be morally
convinced of his client's guilt, he is not to act on that presumption, for he, in
his turn, may also be mistaken in the weight of the testimony, and some
principle of law involved in the case. Every man is to be tried by the law and
the evidence, and the court and the jury are the only judges, known to the
law, upon those two points, and not the counsel. His duty is simply to strive
to lead the jury to a verdict of "not guilty;" and if he misleads them to such a
verdict, the responsibility is theirs, and not his.
Anonymous, The Legal Profession, in The Gladsome Light of Jurisprudence:
Learning the Law in England and the United States in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries, supra note 213, at 216.
214. I leave that project to role critics who would rehabilitate the declension thesis.
215. See, e.g., Anonymous, Study of the Law, in Gladsome Light, supra note 213, at
203; L.J. Bigelow, The Romance and Reality of the Law, 58 The Knickerbocker 97,
105-06 (1861); Isaac Parker, Inaugural Address, 3 N. Am. Rev. 11, 15 (1816); Quincy,
supra note 74, at 215; James Richardson, An Address Delivered Before the Members
of the Norfolk Bar, at Their Request, February 25, 1837, in The Legal Mind in
America, From Independence to the Civil War, supra note 65, at 229, 231-32; Story,
Inauguration, supra note 109, at 183.
216. See generally The Legal Mind in America, From Independence to the Civil
War, supra note 65.
217. See Bigelow, supra note 215, at 107; Greenleaf, supra note 128; Review of T.
Walker's Introduction to American Law, 24 Christian Examiner 221 (1838).
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moral activism as aggressive and detailed as Hoffman's. 211 Indeed,
once it is acknowledged that some civic republican elites also framed
client-centered, ethically neutral advocacy as a mode of lawyering
consistent with "dignity," "honesty," "integrity," "good conscience,"
"justice" and the vision of the lawyer as a virtuous "public sentinel," it
becomes considerably more difficult to say whether those who offered
bromides about the laywer's duty to do justice would have disagreed,
for instance, with Walker's balanced defense of the adversary ethic.
This is especially so with respect to law school orators. Although
Walker and Sharswood demonstrate that close reasoning on specific
ethical questions was possible in such a setting, there appears to have
been an equally strong trend of bold but vague exhortation.
To take but one example, in an address before the Law Academy of
Philadelphia at the opening of classes in 1830, John M. Scott, a vice-
provost of the school, gives a paradigmatic lecture on the republican
lawyer-statesman ideal. 219 All the central elements are present: law as
a science demanding long, diligent toil; lawyers as a governing elite,
dominating not only law practice, but the bench and political offices;
and a demand for perfect integrity in lawyering to forestall public
obloquy and meet the lofty obligations of benevolent governance over
"the ultimate destinies of [the] people. '2 °  Moral exhortation
pervades the piece, 21 and yet Scott offers Lord Brougham's defense of
Queen Caroline as a "towering pinnacle" of professional
achievement.222 He appears to have believed the defense was just, but
he makes no reference to Lord Brougham's maxim, which every other
commentator I have found, including staunch defenders of the
adversary ethic, goes out of their way to distinguish if not denounce.223
218. At least in the tone of exhortation, Simon Greenleaf comes the closest. See
Greenleaf, supra note 128, at 134.
219. The address is reprinted in 13 Hazard's Reg. of Pa. 337 (1833). Other
examples could be given. See, e.g., Story, supra note 109; Story, Inauguration, supra
note 109; Kent, supra note 128.
220. Scott's Address Before the Law Academy of Philadelphia, 13 Hazard's Reg. of
Pa.. 337 (Samuel Hazard ed., 1833) [hereinafter Scott's Address].
221. See, e.g., id. ("Pursued by an upright and honorable mind, [the profession]
frowns upon crime-it spurns at baseness-it abhors fraud-it advocates pure
morality-it upholds truth-it illustrates virtue. In the grasp of an unworthy intellect
or a depraved heart, it becomes the instrument of oppression-the pander of vice-
the patron and partaker of crime."); id. at 340 ("The law emphatically demands
integrity of conduct and purity of morals from its worshippers. How gross the
inconsistency, should they whose whole study is to know how to prescribe the rule of
right to others, be found themselves to be transgressors of that rule.... Endeavour to
be as spotless as your erring nature will permit ... .
222. Id. at 337.
223. Compare id., with Law and Lawyers, supra note 130, at 136-37 (quoting David
Dudley Field's rejection of Lord Brougham's maxim; "a more revolting doctrine
scarcely ever fell from any man's lips"), The Case of the Booms, supra note 131, at
194-95 (Chandler, while defending adversary ethic "do[es] not assent to Lord
Brougham's doctrine, that an advocate is bound to defend his client 'by all expedient
means'-'to protect him at all hazard and cost to all others'-to disregard 'the alarm,
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Moreover, when Scott actually specifies the lawyer's ethical
obligations, we find a broad endorsement of "abstinence from all
falsehood" and professional courtesy toward courts and opposing
counsel, followed by a collection of principles couched in a battlefield
metaphor:
Your profession is a manly and honorable profession. Fair
argument, sound logic, and dauntless truth, intrepidity which fears
no frown, independence which courts no favor, are its manly and
honorable weapons: and he is a recreant to the order, and unworthy
of its emblazonry, who enters its listed fields with less noble
instruments of warfare.
2 24
These principles surely preclude chicane, deception and taking
advantage of an adversary's tactical mistake, but they bar taking a
case of doubtful justice only by inference. Would holding the
prosecution to the standard of proof in a criminal case amount to
perpetrating a falsehood on the court if the client has confessed?
Scott does not say. 25
the suffering, the torment, the destruction which he may bring upon all others.' We do
not defend the practice of attacking the characters of innocent witnesses to destroy
the force of their testimony."), Mr. Charles Phillips's Defence of Courvoisier, supra
note 127, at 551 (quoting English editorial that "[a] more detestable doctrine than
this, or one that, if generally acted on, would more surely break down the whole
framework of society, it is impossible to imagine"), and Anonymous, The Legal
Profession, supra note 213, at 216 (characterizing Brougham's maxim as implausible).
But see Advocates and Clients, supra note 130 (reprinting the maxim without
comment). It is also worth noting that Lord Brougham succeeds in the trial by a
diversion from the merits-by threatening to reveal a secret that would destroy the
King. That is, in fact, the immediate object of his maxim-to convey the threat. See
supra note 90. Again, Scott's praise for Brougham's conduct can be read to endorse
such a trial tactic.
224. Scott's Address, supra note 220, at 340.
225. We have a rather obscure clue from his advice that young Pennsylvania
lawyers should model their practice on the state's older generation of heroic lawyer-
statesmen. He includes Thomas Addis Emmet, a lawyer who was apparently quite
well-known for relying on excessive zeal in cases of doubtful merit. As Emmet's
biographer observes:
His zeal sometimes clouds his judgment, and obscures the perceptions of his
mind. In the worst of causes-in cases where the merits were palpably
against him, I have known him struggle [sic] with the same ardor and
assurance as though he was perfectly persuaded of the justice of his suit.
This has diminished his influence in our courts. They have imbibed a habit
of listening to his legal doctrines with suspicion.
Charles Glidden Haynes, Thomas Addis Emmet, 4 Am. Jurist 116, 125 (1830)
(quotation omitted). G. Edward White is more generous, noting that Emmet's
"eloquence occasionally led to his undoing." White, supra note 14, at 213.
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IV. LIFTING THE VEIL OF ELITE DISCOURSE
A. Elite Practice
The robust debate among civic republican legal elites about what it
meant to be a public sentinel opens but, does not ultimately answer,
the question whether moral activism or client-centered service
dominated the profession. The link between civic republican ideology
and morally activist lawyering (heretofore assumed an exclusive link)
does not hold. But in order to move the analysis beyond the
propagandistic defenses and ideal conceptions of lawyering
propounded in the nineteenth-century discourse of legal elites, we
need to inquire more systematically into the nature and conditions of
law practice. And we need to measure the results of these inquiries
against the larger body of literature on nineteenth-century law and
legal change. However, just as an idealistic discourse cannot be read
as representative of conduct on the ground in a broad profession,
examination of law and law practice cannot be read, in any simple
way, to reflect the normative conceptions of lawyers thus engaged.226
Thus my purpose in this section is twofold: first, to cautiously gesture
in the direction of practice and legal change to suggest that those who
defended the adversary ethic were not out of step with observable
conduct in law practice; second, and perhaps more importantly, to
demonstrate that further work is necessary before broad normative
conclusions of the kind made in role criticism can be drawn.
G. Edward White's biographical accounts of "prominent lawyers
before the Marshall Court" offers a window into some of the
adversarial habits and styles of the lawyer statesmen of the period.
For instance, Littleton Tazewell, a prominent admiralty lawyer from
Norfolk, Virginia, was known for "an intensity and a competitiveness,
and a seemingly greater interest in the mechanics of an argument than
in the intrinsic rightness of the proposition he was arguing.212 7 He
apparently "hated to lose, 228 so much so that, as a contemporary
eulogist observed, he scrupulously studied and used his force of
personality to manipulate jurors: Tazewell "either knew himself or
learned from others the calling of every juryman; and... if he saw a
dangerous man among them he... made the man believe that his
standing in his own business depended upon his bringing a verdict in
[Tazewell's client's] favor. '229 And when Justice Story wrote a draft
226. See Gordon, Independence of Lawyers, supra note 10, at 48-49 (noting
"fuzziness of the concepts and the difficulties of getting 'hard' or sufficient
evidence.., relating to independent counseling"); Gordon, New York City Lawyers,
supra note 10, at 55-57 (discussing interpretive problems linking lawyers' conduct to
their normative discourse).
227. White, supra note 14, at 215.
228. Id. at 226.
229. Id. at 219 (citations omitted).
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opinion in an important admiralty case characterizing one of
Tazewell's technical defenses as "subtle and novel," Tazewell
vehemently objected to the slight-writing Marshall and forcing a
revision. As White recounts:
Tazewell associated the phrase "subtle and novel" with efforts, as he
put it [to a friend], to "put the people upon their guard against me"
by the insinuation that "I am very capable of using a subtle
argument upon any subject." An old charge of sophistry and artifice
had recurred, and the charge had struck deep. "All this I heed not,"
Tazewell said [to his friend]. One suspects otherwise. One suspects
that Tazewell feared that his opponents might have uncovered
something fundamental about his character, and he was determined,
in his proud, bluff fashion, to set things straight. 230
Tazewell is thus a complex figure. While Story's slight has hints of a
political stratagem relating to a rift between Tazewell and the Adams
administration over matters of foreign policy underlying the case
before the Court,23' White agrees that the slight had merit, at least in
the eyes of Tazewell's peers. But one can read the peer criticism
either as lamenting a failure of integrity on Tazewell's part, as a
failure to maintain the credibility necessary to effectively serve his
clients, or as a flaw some of his peers played upon for litigation
advantage. Only the first reading of the criticisms reflects a morally
activist professional ideology.
And the critic who most clearly paints Tazewell's zeal as a moral
flaw, William Wirt,232 is equally open to the charge. Wirt was a
towering figure in the early Supreme Court bar, "arguing 170 cases
between 1815 and 1835," and participating in "all the great Marshall
Court constitutional cases ... as well as other significant private
cases. '233 He served as Attorney General from 1817 to 1829, and was
"as famous as any full time practitioner in the nation. '234 Like other
young lawyers, however, he first made his reputation by taking
criminal cases throughout Virginia. In 1806, a year before he was
called to help George Hay in the famous trial of Aaron Burr, Wirt was
asked to take on the defense of a man charged with murdering
230. Id. at 225.
231. Tazewell was representing the Spanish government regarding a ship it had
commissioned "which had been captured by an American warship... [in 1822] and
brought to Charleston for possible condemnation. The Spanish government sued in
federal district court to prevent condemnation and to recover damages." Id. at 222.
Tazewell's "principle policy argument" challenged the administration's position on
Latin American affairs, and, White argues, Story was sympathetic to the
administration. Id. The case is The Palmyra, 12 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
232. White, supra note 14, at 214-15 ("His fault seemed to consist in the abuse of
his strength; in that laxity of colloquial morals ... which led him to triumph, with
equal pleasure, in every victory, right or wrong." (quoting Wirt)).
233. Id. at 264. 1 am grateful to my colleague Philip Frickey for raising Wirt's
significance in early Supreme Court practice.
234. Id. at 262.
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Chancellor Wythe, the patriarch of the Virginia legal profession.235
The defendant was Wythe's nephew, widely assumed to have
poisoned the Chancellor in order to accelerate his inheritance. The
case is therefore prototypical of those in which Hoffman's Resolutions
prescribe "no such special exertions from any member of our pure and
honorable profession. '236 Wirt not only accepted the defense but won
an acquittal by successfully excluding critical evidence. 7
What makes Wirt's conduct of the case so interesting is the mix of
motives underlying his decision to take it and the fact that the incident
later found its way into the law magazines. In a letter seeking advice
from his wife, Wirt's concerns about the evidence of guilt, the opinion
of polite society, and the possibility of "moral or professional
impropriety," are blended with keen awareness that the case would
help establish his reputation in Richmond, where he had just moved
after years spent practicing in more rural parts of the state.23" Thus,
although Wirt appears to have been more concerned about taking a
case of doubtful justice than Tazewell, the letter suggests those
concerns may well have been overcome by personal ambition and
belief in the adversary ethic, rather than the presence of arguably
exculpatory evidence. The letter is reprinted with the commentary of
Wirt's biographer in the April, 1850, issue of the Monthly Law
Reporter.23 9  The editor closes by noting that Wirt obtained the
235. Charles Warren reports that Wythe was "[b]orn in 1726, admitted to the Bar
in 1756, Professor of Law in 1780 in the College of William and Mary [the nation's
first law professorship], sole chancellor of the Court of Equity in 1788, the legal
teacher of Jefferson... Spencer Roane ... John Breckenridge, John Wickham, H. St.
George Tucker [who inherited Wythe's chair at William and Mary and authored the
famous American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries], L.W. Tazewell, William
Mumford, and George Nicholas." Warren, supra note 24, at 344, 347 n.3.
236. 2 Course, supra note 46, at 756; see also text accompanying note 58.
237. See I John P. Kennedy, Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt, Attorney
General of the United States 150-54 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds.,
William S. Hein & Co. 1973) (1849).
238. The letter reads in part:
What shall I do? If there is no moral or professional impropriety in it, I
know that it might be done in a manner which would avert the displeasure of
every one from me, and give me a splendid debut in the metropolis. Judge
Nelson says I ought not to hesitate a moment to do it; that no one can justly
censure me for it; and, for his own part, he thinks it highly proper that the
young man should be defended. Being himself a relation of Judge Wythe's,
and having the most delicate sense of propriety, I am disposed to confide
very much in his opinion.
Id. at 153. Wirt's biographer describes it as "a case of conscience" because, at least
for the moment, Wirt was financially stable-"no longer impelled by hard necessity"
to take every case that came his way. Id. at 150. He also notes that the Burr trial,
which sealed Wirt's national reputation even though he lost, was repeatedly derailed
by sharpness, "asperity" and personal acrimony between the lawyers- prompting
Justice Marshall to reprimand both sides. On the misconduct, see id. at 163-66. For
the description of the trial, see id. at 161-206.
239. Kennedy's Life of William Wirt, 12 Monthly L. Rep. 613, 622-23 (Stephen H.
Phillips ed., 1850).
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acquittal by invoking a rule of evidence to exclude inculpating witness
testimony: "We leave our readers to criticize his conduct ... [but we]
remark that we have never been able to ascertain that Mr. Wirt's
standing as a man of honor and integrity was tarnished in the least by
his conduct in this instance."24
The practice of prominent lawyers outside the hyper-elite class of
Supreme Court advocates also reveals commitment to adversarial
advocacy.24' Rufus Choate, an orator second only to Webster and an
incomparable trial lawyer,242 presents a fascinating concatenation of
staunch political conservatism, civic republican legal ideology, and
zealous, ethically neutral, client-centered advocacy.243 In his capacity
as an orator for Whig politics and a critic of law reform and
Jacksonian incursions on the legal profession, Choate equated the bar
with conservatism and conservatism with patriotism.244 In an address
at Harvard Law School in 1845, for instance, he denounces
codification and Jacksonian reformism:
We need reform enough, Heaven knows; but it is the reformation of
our individual selves, the bettering of our personal natures.., this is
what we need,-personal, moral, mental reform,-not civil-not
political! No, no! Government, substantially as it is; jurisprudence,
substantially as it is; the general arrangements of liberty,
substantially as they are; the Constitution and the Union, exactly as
they are,-this is to be wise, according to the wisdom of America.
245
240. Id. at 623.
241. Supreme Court advocates besides Tazewell and Wirt are surely worth
exploring. See White, supra note 14, at 230-41 (discussing Luther Martin, one of the
lawyers for Aaron Burr, his "tendency to personalize his advocacy," and his "fierce
loyalty to his clients, however unpopular their status"); id. at 267-89 (discussing
Daniel Webster, "the most famous, the most controversial, and perhaps the most
charismatic of all the leading Marshall Court advocates"; noting that Webster often
failed the ideal of independence "attempt[ing] to trade his political influence for
financial prerequisites... [and] gravely profess[ing] the absence of a financial or
personal interest in issues where such an interest clearly existed"; concluding that "[i]t
is perhaps a telling commentary on the legal and political professions that Webster's
craftiness, relentless ambition, prevarication, and braggadocio rewarded rather than
hampered him as a lawyer and as a politician" (emphasis added)); see also Robert W.
Gordon, The Devil and Daniel Webster, 94 Yale L.J. 445, 454-60 (1984) (reviewing
The Papers of Daniel Webster: Legal Papers (Alfred S. Konefsky & Andrew J. King
eds., 1982-83)).
242. Perry Miller describes him as "the most successful pleader of his day." The
Legal Mind in America, From Independence to the Civil War, supra note 65, at 259.
243. See, e.g., Jean V. Matthews, Rufus Choate: The Law and Civic Virtue 71
(1980) (describing Whig political philosophy).
244. Rufus Choate, The Position and Functions of the American Bar, as an Element
of Conservatism in the State: An Address Delivered Before the Law School in
Cambridge, July 3, 1845, in The Legal Mind in America, From Independence to the
Civil War, supra note 65, at 258, 260-61.
245. Id. at 263-64.
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Law, he continued, is not the "actual and present will" of the
majority.2 46 "It is not the offspring of will at all. It is the absolute
justice of the State, enlightened by the perfect reason of the State.
That is law. '247 Choate was prefacing an argument for adherence to
common law adjudication, which he depicts as a "mighty and
continuous stream of experience and reason, accumulated, ancestral,
widening and deepening and washing itself clearer as it runs on. "248
The "grand and prominent public function of the American Bar,"
then, is none other than "conservation.... We find our city of marble,
and we will leave it marble. ' 249 Choate concludes the address with a
civic republican exhortation to disinterested virtue: "On behalf of
clients, often; on behalf of the law, always. "250
And yet in his lively practice, Choate was both reviled and revered
for zealous advocacy. A biographer observes that, "in whatever kind
of case, his devotion to his client was absolute; for the length of the
trial he seemed almost to absorb himself in his client.215 1 And in jury
trials he was relentless:
[S]o complete was his command of the jury, it was said that while he
practiced in Salem, no client of his was ever convicted in a criminal
case. This was not an entirely enviable reputation to have. People
began to say that he was the scourge of society, that behind his aegis
crime could flourish uncontrolled. It was the beginning of that
tincture of mistrust mixed with admiration that would later earn him
the slightly dubious sobriquet, "the wizard of the law." 252
He also showed no hesitation to attack the character of opposing
witnesses. "The aim was to dispose of the evidence by destroying the
credibility of the individual. ' 253 Thus in an insurance case, he deftly
undermined the unfaltering, and by all lights, truthful testimony of a
witness by means of defamation:
[H]e could not budge the testimony of one witness even after a day-
long cross-examination, but he did bring out the man's general "bad
character" and reputation and dwelt at length on this in his closing
remarks to the jury. "Do you suppose, gentlemen, that in this vast
violation of all the sentiments and virtues that bind men together in
246. Id. at 264.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 266.
249. Id. at 271-72; see also Matthews, supra note 243, at 151 (noting that Choate
had "an exalted conception of the legal profession as almost an order of chivalry in
the service of the state").
250. The Legal Mind in America, From Independence to the Civil War, supra note
65, at 273 n.8 (emphasis added).
251. Matthews, supra note 243, at 153 (emphasis omitted).
252. Id. at 23 (internal quotations omitted).
253. Id. at 156.
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civil society, veracity alone would survive in the chaos of such a
character? 2 54
Although courteous to opposing counsel, he regularly attempted to
portray the opposing party as a villain, and (however much of a
stretch it required) to portray his client in a "tragic and poetic" light. 5
"Above all, he relied on the fact that the burden of proof must lay
with the prosecution." '256 So he was a master of "defense by
alternative hypothesis. 257 In a famous murder case, for example, in
which Choate's client was accused of slitting the throat of his mistress
"in a brothel where they had been living together, 258 Choate
hypothesized that "[s]uicide is the natural death of the prostitute"
and, alternatively, that if his client had committed the crime, he must
have been sleepwalking.2 59 The evidence against his client was largely
circumstantial, but, just for insurance in his closing, he invited jury
nullification by reading from an article against capital punishment and
reminding the jury that the governor could not grant clemency in
cases of this kind. The jury acquitted.26
Can we call this lawyering on behalf of clients, often; on behalf of
the law, always? The converse seems more plausible. In his law
practice, Choate exemplifies a client-centered, ethically neutral norm
at least as strong as that advanced by Chandler and Jackson.26 What
did Choate mean, then, by placing the duty to law over the duty to
client? Did he mean, in the language of modern ethics doctrine,
zealous client service within the bounds of the law? This seems
singularly unlikely given the tone of his address at Harvard, yet his
practice seems to stretch even the modern doctrine.
As Choate's practice shows, once the veil of elite discourse on the
role is lifted, a very complex picture of individual motivation and
practical approaches toward the role emerges. Choate's public
reputation indicates that his own litigation conduct was among the
causes of popular distrust and animosity toward lawyers.262 And yet
he was a far cry from the ignorant, untrained upstarts republican legal
elites like him tended to blame for bringing the profession into
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 157.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 158.
260. Id.
261. On the rare occasion when Choate broke from ethical neutrality, it was
apparently in service of political principles. See id. at 214-15 (declining to represent a
fugitive slave on grounds of positional conflict in 1854); cf. id. at 160 (describing
Choate as "uneasy" and diminished in zeal during brief stint as prosecutor).
262. See, e.g., id. at 158-59 (describing trial in which witness for the prosecution
claimed he was "persuaded into the crime by Choate's client, who had assured him
that if anything went wrong 'there was a man in Boston named Choate and he'd get
us off if they caught us with the money in our boots' (emphasis omitted)).
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disgrace. So his practice seems all the more inconsistent with his
conservative pronouncements on the obligations of the profession.
Did Choate see a conflict? If so, did he embrace it or try to suppress
it? We cannot know for certain-though he appears, at least, not to
have flagged in practice when criticisms were made.263 Matthews, on
the other hand, suggests he had "a personality for which dissolution
was always a real possibility."'
But whatever Choate's views on the matter, the apparent tension
between his status as an exponent of civic republican ideology and his
well-documented practice of the adversary ethic, suggests that we
need to look much more closely and think much more carefully about
what follows in legal ethics from a commitment to civic republican
values. Preliminarily, it appears that, at least in practice, lawyer-
statesmen in the civic republican mainstream fell into habits and styles
consistent with the adversary ethic. Lay criticism and peer criticism
may have had a deterrent effect, but that effect would obviously have
been diminished to the extent that elite lawyers felt their conduct in
practice actually served civic republican values.2 65 Lay criticism could
then be dismissed as a misconception of the demands of the lawyering
role and peer criticism could be dismissed either as internal
dissonance about the range of role conceptions consistent with civic
republican values, or, as we saw with Tazewell, strategic efforts to
diminish an able competitor's credibility.
B. "Rank and File" Lawyers
Stepping back from elite practice altogether, there is, evidence to
suggest that "rank and file" lawyers adhered to a client-centered ethic
in practice even as they debated the proper normative conception of
the role. Frances McCurdy's study of the art of oratory in Missouri
frontier law practice emphasizes the public spectacle of trials and the
lawyer's reliance on showmanship, tactical prowess, pandering to the
jury, ruthless or ridiculing cross-examination, and "flay[ing] each
other with sarcasm and invective. 26 6 Vigorous protection of the right
263. Standard biographical sources are scarce in Choate's case. He was not,
Matthews notes, a letter writer, nor did he attempt any schematic writings -"his ideas
are scattered, as they were communicated, in various speeches and orations." Id. at 3.
And he may have won a war of attrition after all, or at least his supporters were not
shaken in their faith. When he passed away in 1859, "Boston hung its flags at half
mast and sounded minute guns in mourning." Id.
264. Id. at 5.
265. A good example is John Adams' well-known defense of British soldiers
involved in the Boston Massacre. See 3 L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, Legal
Papers of John Adams 1 (1965); John Phillip Reid, A Lawyer Acquitted: John Adams
and the Boston Masacre Trials, 18 Am. J. Legal Hist. 189 (1974).
266. Frances McCurdy, Courtroom Oratory of the Pioneer Period, 56 Monthly Hist.
Rev. 7 (1961). On western law practice generally, see Friedman, supra note 8, at 163-
67.
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to a jury trial under Missouri law meant that even fairly trivial
disputes were often litigated to trial. Thus,
[sikill in appealing to jurors.., became highly important to the
success of attorneys. Learning the desires and prejudices of each
man on the jury, successful pleaders, such as Henry Vorhis of
Buchanan County, placed themselves close to the jury boxes and
spoke to each man by name as if they relied solely on his decision
for justice. John B. Clark ignored the principles of law, but learned
the history of every man on the jury, his associations, likes and
dislikes, and his peculiarities of temperament, and based his case on
that knowledge. The outstanding strength of the pioneer lawyer lay
in his ability to stir his listeners to anger, laughter, or tears.267
Although there were a few, McCurdy adds, who thrived at the bar
without "strategy and pathetic appeals.., because they knew legal
principles and precedents and reasoned clearly and logically," all
"sought to find the method that would win favorable verdicts. 2 68
Similarly, Fannie Memory Farmer's study of antebellum circuit-
riding lawyers in North Carolina reveals that lawyers often came to
blows in the courtroom ("at the conclusion of a bout the judge would
fine the offenders and resume court" 269), that witnesses and parties
were often "bullyragged" by opposing counsel, and that because trials
were such public spectacles ("great crowds attended court despite the
uncomfortable physical surroundings""27 ") lawyers "who put on a good
show often attracted more clients than those who practiced in a quiet,
dignified manner. '271 Although ethics rules were informal and "lax,"
Farmer argues that "most lawyers probably felt a certain amount of
responsibility toward maintaining reasonably high standards. 27 2 She
doubts, however, that many lawyers reached even the relatively client-
centered standard Augustus S. Merrimon worked out in his journal
while riding the circuit:
I do not consider it the duty of a Lawyer to bewilder a Jury or the
Court and lead their minds astray. This is not what a lawyer ought
to do, and I consider it highly dishonorable for him to do it. It is
every lawyer's duty to seek after the true and just rights of his
clients, and to present his case in the most forcible light to the court
and jury and he has not done his duty until he has done this; but it is
not part of the duty of the lawyer to assist a scoundrel at law or in
267. See McCurdy, supra note 266, at 4-5.
268. Id. at 8-9, 11.
269. Fannie Memory Farmer, Legal Practice and Ethics in North Carolina: 1820-
1860, 30 N.C. Hist. Rev. 329, 335 (1953).
270. Id. at 336; see also id. at 334 (noting that members of the public "found a
favorite means of relaxation in attending trials. The court was the center of activity;
most men went-both to see their friends and for the diversion of watching court
proceedings. The spectators not only watched the trials, but often indulged in
drinking while at court.").
271. Id. at 342.
272. Id. at 348.
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regard to the facts and whenever this is done, the man who does it is
to some extent and [sic] accomplice .... A Lawyer, in the true sense
of the term, never studies Chikenery [sic] and low cunning. No, a
man who is a lawyer, never fears to meet the question and battle
face to face.273
Roughly comparable habits and views (with the exception of
courtroom brawls) can be found in the pages of Daniel Rogers' New
York City Hall Recorder, one of the few early nineteenth-century case
reporters to publish accounts of trials 4.27  Generally, Rogers reported
proceedings from the New York Court of Sessions-trials, mostly
criminal, before the Mayor as presiding judge, and the city Aldermen.
The court's jurisdiction included both felonies and misdemeanors,
and, in 1816, the first year of the reporter, the vast majority of
reported cases were jury trials for grand larceny, forgery and passing
counterfeit bills, robbery, and obtaining goods by false pretenses.
Two murder trials, two bigamy trials and a handful of civil cases were
also reported.
Rogers apparently could not resist the temptation, on occasion, to
embellish the renditions with biblical references and introductions or
conclusions to the actual trial that reprove, admonish, or expound
upon the moral aspects of the case. Testimony, arguments of counsel
and the court's rulings and instructions to the jury are also
paraphrased or skipped altogether as often as they are quoted
directly. So the reporter is both incomplete and, in places, clearly
tendentious, but it nonetheless appears to convey a useful portrait of
criminal trial practice in New York City.
Only impressionistic conclusions can be drawn because we do not
knovr what the lawyers knew or believed about their cases, but the
reported trials disclose a style of practice that is, by and large, client-
centered. Defendants who appear, on the face of the facts presented,
guilty, were nevertheless represented with vigor and sometimes
acquitted;275 and lawyers not only pressed for technical legal
273. Id. at 349 (alterations in original) (quoting Newsom, The A.S. Merrimon
Journal, 1853-1854, North Carolina Historical Review, VIII (July, 1931), No.3, 304);
see also id. (quoting a more moralistic standard in an article arguing that "the good
advocate was one who would not plead a cause if 'his tongue must be confuted by his
conscience"').
274. See Friedman, supra note 8, at 326 ("With few exceptions, official reporters
contained only appellate opinions. Occasionally, newspapers covered important or
lurid trials; a few trial transcripts appeared as pamphlets."); see also Bloomfield, supra
note 24, at 73 (noting that Rogers' Recorder "reported many municipal court
decisions not ordinarily available in printed form"; also noting that William Sampson,
a principal in the codification movement, practiced there for a time).
275. See, e.g., Rhodes' Case 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 1 (1816) (acquitting from forgery
charge where defendant sought change for a badly altered ten dollar bill and fled
when it appeared tavern owner had gone for a watchman); Traux's Case, 1 N.Y. City
Hall Rec. 43, 44-45 (1816) (acquitting from grand larceny charge where defendant
who admitted stealing silver spoons and a dressing case was "a young man of property
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defenses,2"6 they used tactical devices such as attacking the character
of witnesses and playing to the sympathies and prejudices of the
1 77 th sjury. At the same time, in four cases in 1816, the defense lawyer
and respectable in his connexions in the city of Albany ... [whose] senses had been
impaired, and his moral faculties totally ruined by the excessive use of ardent
liquor"); Hill's Case, I N.Y. City Hall Rec. 57 (1816) (acquitting from charge of
receiving stolen goods where defendant, a pawnbroker, disclaimed knowledge that
goods were stolen); Blake's Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 99 (1816) (acquitting from
murder charge husband, accused of stabbing wife in the chest, even though found with
blood on his shirt, fingernails and arms, and a bloody knife in his pocket).
276. See, e.g., Rhodes' Case, t N.Y. City Hall Rec. 1 (1816) (defense counsel
arguing for strict construction of forgery statute and attacking indictment for failing to
track formal aspects of statute); Ridgway's Case, I N.Y. City Hall Rec. 3 (1816)
(pressing for technical legal defense for grand larceny); McNiffs Case, I N.Y. City
Hall Rec. 8 (1816) (moving to dismiss indictment on ground that prosecution
witnesses were convicted felons and accomplices to the crime, therefore incompetent
to testify; denied); Jackson's Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 28 (1816) (upholding
prosecution's objection to introduction of defendant's confession to victim in grand
larceny case where confession was obtained in expectation of favor; victim promised
not to turn in the defendant); Lazarus Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 89 (1816) (entering
nolle prosequi after defense counsel offered seven technical defenses); Vosburgh's
Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 130 (1816) (rejecting as too formal defendant's motion for
acquittal on ground that the name on a bad check varied by two letters out of six from
the name stated in the indictment); Williams' Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 149 (1816)
(acquitting defendant after successful motion to exclude confession of grand larceny
"extorted by fear" in the stationhouse); Sellick's Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 185, 188
(1816) (discussing how defense counsel in murder trial successfully excluded
testimony of a black man, who swore he had been freed, on ground he was not in
possession of manumission papers and could not be freed by owner's wife under
doctrine of coverture). On the prominence and success of technical defenses in
criminal cases of the early nineteenth century, see Friedman, supra note 8, at 149-52
(defining and discussing "hypertrophy" and "record worship" of appellate judges,
arguing that hypertrophy "served the needs of the dominant American male-the
self-reliant man ... supremely confident of his own judgment, but... jealous of the
power of the state").
277. See, e.g., McNiffs Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 8, 10 (1816) (sustaining
character attack on key prosecution witnesses; "M'Donald was only in Bridewell
[prison] for beating his wife; but this day he has made higher proofs. Betts has two
callings; one half the time he thieves, and the other he witnesses."); Riley's Case, 1
N.Y. City Hall Rec. 23, 25 (1816) (describing how defense counsel pleaded with jury
in grand larceny case to have sympathy for defendant "[a] woman with three small
children, a stranger in the city, with few friends"); Rothbone's Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall
Rec. 26, 27 (1816) (describing how the prosecutor's closing argument, in trial against
woman for "keep[ing] a disorderly house"-referred to jurors "as fathers, as
brothers" and asked "Will you, by your verdict,.. . suffer infamy itself, in its most
hideous deformity, to stalk your streets? Will you permit women of this description
to seduce and lead astray your daughters, your sisters, and your female servants, with
impunity?"); Brigham's Case, I N.Y. City Hall Rec. 30 (1816) (denying motion to
postpone trial on defendant's request for time to secure testimony of exculpatory
witness; prosecution argued motion was for purposes of delay only); Spence v. DuffY,
1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 39, 40 (1816) (involving civil action for damages for assault and
battery where defendant store owner forcibly detained woman who refused to buy
linen once defendant had cut it; defense counsel, William Sampson, closed by
observing "that it had of late become so fashionable for women to assume the
character of suitors in this court, that he was fearful its attention would soon be
exclusively confined to the litigations of the sex. He knew in what a melting mood a
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"threw up his brief" during trial when confronted with strong proof by
the prosecutor.278
These examples-gathered from different strata of the bar, and
from different states-collectively support the inference that the
various normative defenses of lawyering offered by Chandler,
Jackson, and Walker resonated with the styles and habits of practicing
lawyers. This is not to say either that client-centered, ethically neutral
lawyering dominated practice or that practitioners were free from
public and peer criticism insofar as they followed that norm rather
than moral activism. I argue only that the evidence suggests the
adversary ethic had firm roots in both law practice and the ideology of
civic republican elites. Authors like Chandler, Jackson and Walker
were not simply creating a consoling but essentially fictional ideal in
response to public criticism of the bar. Rather, their defenses of
client-centered lawyering take the form of a partial demurrer,
admitting that lawyers take unjust cases and arguing (in different
woman's cause was apt to find the jury; that an appeal would be made to their
gallantry, and that they would be conjured, in compassion to the tenderness of the
sex, to pronounce a heavy verdict against his client; that they knew the way in which
shoppers like the plaintiff taxed and fretted the time and patience of industrious
dealers like his client."); Hill's Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 57, 58 (1816) (prosecuting
witness in trial for receiving stolen goods; defense counsel said "Look, gentlemen of
the Jury, at the foul character of the principal witness ... the meanest reptile in the
creation is an Angel of light compared with this abandoned profligate. And yet he
appears against a respectable citizen, and you are shortly to be called upon,
gentlemen, to pronounce the defendant guilty from such testimony!"); M'Dougal v.
Sharp, I N.Y. City Hall Rec. 73 (1816) (extending vacuous defense against a civil suit
for slander, prompting court to excoriate defense for bad faith); Goldsby and Covert's
Cases, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 81 (1816) (prosecution, in trial for forgery, attempting to
establish defendants' guilt by association, argued defendants were arrested and lived
with convicts; court ruled inadmissible); Francis and Jones' Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall
Rec. 121 (1816) (noting that the counsel for perjury defendant "poured forth a torrent
of invective against the Police, unsupported by testimony" in his closing argument
until ordered by judge to "confine himself to the evidence").
278. Rogers adds color to at least one of the withdrawals. In a robbery trial, he
reports: "On the disclosure of [adverse] testimony, Dr. Graham, with that honest
indignation which naturally arises in the mind of every man at such atrocious villainy,
immediately abandoned their defense." Stewart and Van Orden's Case, 1 N.Y. City
Hall Rec. 80, 81 (1816); see also Mitchell's Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 5 (1816) (noting
that the defense lawyer withdrew after store clerk's testimony in trial for grand
larceny); Decosta's Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 83, 84-85 (1816) (noting that, in
misdemeanor trial for obtaining property under false pretenses, defense counsel
withdrew after conceding "that he had been led to believe that the state of the facts
was different from what they now appeared to be" and that he had prepared a
defense that would not meet the prosecution's proof); Henry, Palmer, Smith &
M'Colgan's Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 128, 129 (1816) (noting, in trial for highway
robbery, that "after the introduction of testimony concerning the apprehension of the
prisoners in their flight, Rodman rested the cause, and Price, as Counsel for the
prisoners, abandoned their defense"); cf Walworth's Case, 1 N.Y. City Hall Rec. 171
(1816) (prosecution dropping bigamy case after own witnesses could not verify
defendant's cohabitation with second husband).
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ways) that this is actually consistent with rule of law values and the
civic republican conception of the lawyer as a public sentinel.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this article has been to pierce the myth that civic
republicanism in the nineteenth century was exclusively consistent
with a morally activist conception of the lawyer's role. This myth has
misled role critics to the conclusion that strong, public defenses of the
adversary ethic do not emerge until the bar's late nineteenth-century
professionalization project and its concomitant exposure to the
influence of corporate capitalism. In light of the rich antebellum
discourse on the relationship between client-centered, ethically
neutral representation and civic republican ideology, and
manifestations of this concept of representation in law practice, the
declension thesis must be reconsidered.
Perhaps, upon reconsideration, we shall find that the profession was
in "decline" well before 1870. Law and lawyers, after all, were already
beginning to settle around the interests of a burgeoning commercial
and mercantile class in the antebellum period and, as I have shown,
the adversary ethic was well established.2 79 Lawyers' efforts to frame
emergent liberal individualist impulses in the discourse of older civic
republican commitments could thus be seen as an ideological
project-a response to the strain produced by tension between the
demands of increasingly powerful and wealthy clients, on the one
hand, and the ideal of virtuous public action on the other.28
But, even if a colorable claim could be made on this front, I am less
inclined to extend the declension thesis..' than I am to explore what it
279. See Horwitz, supra note 24, at 140-59 (discussing success of early nineteenth-
century "alliance between the mercantile classes and the legal profession"); Lawrence
M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67
Colum. L. Rev. 50 (1967); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the American Economic
Order, 1789-1910, 10 Law & Soc'y Rev. 57, 65 (1975) ("It is now well accepted that
the 'style' of judicial law-making, at least before 1860, was predominantly
instrumental, reflecting pragmatic concern to advance productivity and material
growth.").
280. As G. Edward White has argued in the context of the protest against renewal
of the Second Bank of the United States, by the Jacksonian period "a kind of crisis in
the language of republicanism [developed] in which the conventional words of that
language were being used to convey liberal policies that did not seem consistent with
the vision of society that the language had originally sought to convey." White, supra
note 14, at 67 (emphasis added).
281. After all, long before the Jacksonian era, federalists openly "questioned the
classical formulation that bound republicanism in some unique way to the principle of
virtue." Bailyn, supra note 14, at 376; see also Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and
Early American Historiography, 39 Wm. & Mary Q. 334, 347 (1982) ("[L]ate
eighteenth-century America already exemplified the aggressive, individualistic,
entrepreneurial spirit" often thought to have emerged only by the nineteenth-
century.). So the seeds of liberalism were planted early indeed. Cf Bailyn, supra note
14, at 351-52.
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would mean to acknowledge that the profession has always already
been divided about the definition and justifiability of the lawyering
role. Whiggish histories of the antebellum legal profession first
obscured this internal division by treating the apprentice system,
reduced admissions standards, the unpopularity of lawyers, and lack
of professional organization or formal disciplinary structures as
evidence of a degraded period which (thankfully, they insisted) gave
way to the professionalization project at the turn of the century.282 On
this account, the elite bar of the early and mid-nineteenth century was
divided against the public and uneducated pettifoggers, but not
against itself. Role criticism goes further, erasing the division
altogether by hypostatizing the morally activist concept of lawyering
advocated by Hoffman and Sharswood. We need a fresh start.283
At least one reason to embrace both the division and the rich
debates it has provoked is that greater dangers lie in their suppression
or superficial resolution. Both client-centered and morally activist
conceptions of the role are pernicious in their extreme forms since
both can lead to injustice and, ultimately, to lawlessness-a tyranny of
omnipotent clients or a tyranny of omnipotent lawyers. If nothing
else then, openly acknowledging, carefully studying, and even coming
to enjoy the contest between the two ideals, may operate to preserve
an essential "habit of reluctance" in their proponents.284
282. See Bloomfield, supra note 24, at 136 (discussing whiggish bias of Charles
Warren, Anton-Hermann Chroust and Roscoe Pound).
283. An obvious starting point is to admit, with Robert E. Shalhope, that the
precise meaning of republican ideology, "and whether it bore the same significance
for Americans in all social ranks and in every region, remains open to question."
Shalhope, supra note 281. While "republicanism's emphasis on virtue and sound
character became the ground on which men of differing persuasions could unite
against a common enemy" during the revolutionary period, "republicanism did not
exist as a monolithic entity" even then. Id. at 341; see also id. 346. In the decades
following the Revolution, Shalhope insists, the historical record is considerably more
opaque-a fact role critics have ignored in borrowing from historians focused on
republicanism at the founding. Id. at 346-47 (claiming that for later periods "we lack
the careful re-creation of social and economic life typified by the colonial
studies ... "). More importantly, Shalhope suggests, what we do know indicates wide
class and regional variation in concepts of republicanism, so that "the identification of
an individual or group as 'republican' is insufficient to explain behavior." Id. at 352
(emphasis added). In this light, we should not be surprised to find authors like
Chandler, Jackson, and Walker, insisting that ethically neutral, client-centered
lawyering is a virtuous theory of the role.
284. Postema, supra note 44, at 169.
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